

Bureaucracy and Politics
in
the Greek Public Administration

thesis for M.Phil (Mode A) degree

by

Dimitra Nanousis

at

University of St.Andrews

Department of Management



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To Nanousis

Acknowledgements

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ABSTRACT

This study is about the current operation of the Greek Public Administration (G.P.A.) and the effects of political interference in this operation. It examines how political involvement affects bureaucratic procedures and how reinforces dysfunctions which are generated by the nature of bureaucracy itself.

The study analyses several aspects of the bureaucratic process such as selection, promotion, or allocation of employees in relation to both bureaucracy and politics. In so doing, it draws on sociological theories of bureaucracy and empirical data collected from public services within the G.P.A. Historical factors and cultural traits are also considered as variables which contribute to the configuration of the workplace culture.

The research findings indicate that the nature of political influence on public administration in Greece is detrimental to its operation; at the same time it increases ones analytical ambivalence about the identification of bureaucracy with efficiency. Furthermore these politics seem to enhance bureaucratic control while bureaucracy through its structure allows an increase of politicization of the G.P.A. The consequence of this double-edged relation is an extensive inefficiency and ineffectiveness of the G.P.A. which in turn has detrimental effects on the socio-economic status of the state.

It is evident that it, the G.P.A., is to be reformed it needs to be transformed on the basis of more humanisation and less Politcization. However, one is ambivalent as to whether or not political forces will cease to be involved in the

bureaucratic process of the G.P.A. and whether or not it is feasible that the Greek bureaucracy can adopt humanistic principles. That is because political power draws sustenance from the control procedures that the bureaucracy facilitates.

This bureaucracy, in turn, has until now not seemed willing to learn from its own errors. The impasse, dysfunctionality and administrative malaise seem unbreakable under the present political conjuncture.

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C O N T E N T S

Page

INTRODUCTION			1
CHAPTER	I	: Bureaucracy	20
	I 1:	Introduction	20
	I 2:	What is bureaucracy?	21
	I 3:	Critiques on Weber and bureaucracy	31
	I 4:	Bureaucracy - Power and Politics	46
	I 5:	Conclusion	54
CHAPTER	II	: Bureaucracy and the Greek Public Administration	57
	II 1:	Introduction	57
	II 2:	Is the G.P.A. bureaucratic?	58
	2a:	the formal structure of the G.P.A.	58
	2b:	the bureaucratic G.P.A. in reality	62
	II 3:	History of the G.P.A.	71
	II 4:	Conclusion	80
CHAPTER III		: "Rouspheti"	82
	III 1:	Introduction	82
	III 2:	"Rouspheti" - Political involvement versus impersonality	83
	III 3:	Selection	89
	III 4:	Employees' allocation-moving	96
	III 5:	Promotion - appraisal system	102
	III 6:	Conclusion	108
CHAPTER	IV	: Managerial control and labour resistance - The Greek version	109
	IV 1:	Introduction	109
	IV 2:	The nature of management control	111
	IV 3:	Management control and the G.P.A.	120
	3a:	Managers in the G.P.A.	120
	3b:	The means of managerial control in the G.P.A. and its implications for employees' identity	124
	3c:	public servants' resistance	135
	IV 4:	Public servants' trade union	140
	IV 5:	Conclusion	145
CHAPTER	V	: Workplace culture	147
	V 1:	Introduction	147
	V 2:	Culture in the G.P.A.	148

C O N T E N T S (Cont.)

	<u>Page</u>
2a: A brief review of organisational culturer	148
2b: Factor influencing the G.P.A.	152
V 3: Interpersonal and intergroup relationships	158
V 4: Conclusion	168
CONCLUSION	170
REFERENCES	

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Aims and Objectives

Historically, the ancient civilization of Greece has greatly affected the cultures of the European nations and the values of liberty and of democracy. In recent history, Greece was engaged in the struggles against fascism, manifesting once again its adherence to these values. More recently still, in 1980, Greece embraced the idea of the united Europe by becoming a member of the European Economic Community (EEC). Greece, thereby, declared its determination to co-operate with the other European countries in order to enhance the well being of its citizens and to promote the values of liberty and democracy. In so doing, Greece became accountable, not only to its citizens, but also to its European counterparts.

This great accountability has resulted in a general reappraisal of Greek policy within the country. In the face of these increased external demands, a detailed examination of the State superstructure has been undertaken during the 1980s. This thorough review has revealed major organisational problems in Greek Public Administration (GPA).

This thesis is concerned to examine the contemporary operation of the G.P.A. It does so by drawing on sociological theories of bureaucracy and empirical research in three public sectors related organisations in Greece. The G.P.A. like public sector organisations in many other

countries, has recently been under attack from various commentators because of perceived inefficiencies within its internal systems. Against this background, the following thesis seeks to identify the extent to which these criticisms are valid and the underlying reasons for the problems facing the G.P.A.

The last ten years, in particular, has seen a growing concern expressed by Greek politicians, academics and the press about the apparent inefficiencies of the G.P.A. In addition to diagnosing the problems, they have tried to find the reasons for the malaise of the of the G.P.A. and have sometimes proposed possible remedies. In order to demonstrate the various dimensions of the problem, as defined by commentators I will cite some extracts from the hundreds of reports which appear in scholarly magazines and the daily press:

"We will not be surprised if the officials of the Common Market, who are studying the country's administrative system, because so desperate that they will suggest the complete abolition of the existing administrative system and the establishment of a new one." (15.4.1976, newspaper "*Acropolis*") "Greeks do not seem to understand that each change in the country affects and is reflected by Public Administration which becomes our primary problems . "(A Kanelopoulos, politician, academic, 1906-1976 in newspaper "*To Vima*").

"Our Public Administration is the poorest in Western Europe; it is over-populated, under-productive, immobilized, unspecialized, lazy and inimical to teamwork, anti-social, irresponsible and prone to illiberal measures. It is unable to take us either into Europe or to modernisation and progress..."(3.10.1977, newspaper "*Eleftherotypia*").

"Now the time has come when Greece must go through its social and economic revolution, which will include radical measures and full restructuring in Public Administration. "(G. Abbott, President of the Greek Chamber of Commerce and Industry, in the Magazine '*Economicos Tahidromos*' issue of 7-9. 1978).

"Our country is at high level of socio-economic development, but its administration has not followed this evolution. From the point of view of institutions and methodology, it is, therefore, necessary to adjust as soon as possible, our administrative mechanism. "(interview of K. Mitsotakis, Minister of Coordination in newspaper "*Apogevmatini*" issue of 5.5. 1979).

"Generally the Greek Public Sector is distinguished for its intensive ineffectiveness, anachronisms, superficiality, lack of effective educational programmes, non-meritocracy, supremacy of mediocracy, plethora of and unequal distribution of staff, poor time-keeping and absenteeism, diffusion of responsibility, inadequate control, inequalities in payment. "(Dr. Th. Katsanevas, member of the executive office of the Socialist party (ΠΑΣΟΚ) in the

"*Administrative Reformation*" Magazine, 1980, issue I).

"...it would not be the first time that the over-crowded G.P.A. and its bureaucracy were lamented..."(18.6.1989 newspaper *To Vima*)

"23 December 1981: the government has to consider the administrative problem of the country... where two of its well-known pathological symptoms are "bureaucracy" on the one hand and '*rouspheti*' from the Bavarian era... on the other ."

21 June 1985: the open wound of Public Administration is the bureaucracy..." (Ch. Babilis, 4.2.1990 in the newspaper "*Kathimerini*")

The foregoing quotations and literally hundreds of others, which are impossible to include in this work, demonstrate the degree of consensus that exists concerning the problems in the G.P.A. They also indicate the apparent intractability and the persistence of these problems of

inefficiency. Furthermore in the last few quotations, inefficiency in the G.P.A. is attributed to 'bureaucracy' and to '*rouspheti*'.* Equally the final quotation, seems to treat 'bureaucracy' and '*rouspheti*' as two independent factors equally responsible for G.P.A.'s inefficiency. Yet, as I will elaborate later, '*rouspheti*' and bureaucracy are by definition two contradictory terms inasmuch as the former implies personal and political interference in the administrative process, while the latter implies impersonality.

Also the term bureaucracy, which is repeatedly mentioned in the quotations of critics of the G.P.A. contains a great deal of negative and pejorative meaning such as '*red tape*' and delay in procedures. The pejorative meanings of bureaucracy, as M. Albrow (1970) points out must be sought in the nineteenth-century writing on bureaucracy. In the studies of Von Mohl, Olszewski and Le Play bureaucracy is presented as the popular discontent with government while seeing the essence of bureaucracy in officiousness of the paid officials.

* The term '*rouspheti*' has been adopted by the Greek glossary, taken from the Arabic though Turkish and implies favouritism, nepotism, partial treatment. It is particularly linked with the G.P.A. inasmuch as it seems to underpin most of the administrative procedures, and to allow the intervention of political parties in the various aspects of the operation of the G.P.A.

This concept of bureaucracy in the nineteenth-century along with two others, namely a) bureaucracy as a form of government (Gournay, Mill) and b) bureaucracy as an administrative form lead to the conceptual paradoxes of twentieth-century where bureaucracy appears both as administrative efficiency and administrative inefficiency. Weber's ideal-type identifies bureaucracy with efficiency because it provides speed in procedures, precision and standardization. Furthermore, ideal bureaucracy does not seem to be fertile ground for '*rouspheti*' because the former is based on impersonality while the latter is not.

What happens then in the G.P.A.? Is the G.P.A. inefficient because it applies bureaucracy in the way that it was defined by Weber, or is it the case that the G.P.A. departs from the ideal bureaucratic type? What is the role of '*rouspheti*'?

The aim of this study, therefore, is to respond to these questions, by examining the key issues of bureaucracy and '*rouspheti*' in the G.P.A.. This objective is pursued through exploration of the historical development of the G.P.A. combined with an examination of major issues such as managerial control, and the organisational structure and the culture of the G.P.A.

The inefficiency in the G.P.A. is neither a new nor unexplored question. There are quite a number of studies and recent bibliography (Athanasopoulos 1983, Tsoukalas 1986, Mouzelis 1978, Pagakis 1988 etc) concerned with this issue. I cite two recent studies: the study of

'Administration and Democracy - The administrative problem of Greece and its resolution' by M. Mathioudakis and V. Andronopoulos (1980) published in the magazine *'Administrative Reformation'* and the study entitled *'Culture Cap in Greek Management'* by D. Bourantas, J. Anagnostelis, Y. Mantes, A. Kefalas (1990) published in *Organisation Studies*. However, while these studies deal with similar issues to the present study, they focus on different perspectives. Thus, the first study deals with strategic remedies of the G.P.A. while the second study considers management in enterprises and organisations in the Greek private sector.

The study begins by emphasizing the importance of Public Administration in the operation of the modern state and the maintenance of democracy. It then focuses on the structure of the G.P.A. and examines it in relation to the socio-economic changes which have taken place in the State. The authors argue that the G.P.A. has delayed those changes and hence they suggest that the G.P.A. must be transformed because of the benefits that will accrue

Then they consider the whole question of the G.P.A. from a practical perspective, proposing strategies that will change its structure and solve the problems of inefficiency contained therein. These recommendations are the administrative experience of the writers. According to them, their aim is to give applicable solutions to the problems of the G.P.A. and not to enrich, the already considerable

literature about public administration by adding yet more theoretical material.

By contrast, this study is concerned to contribute to an understanding of the current operation of the G.P.A. Indeed, I would argue that theoretical and empirical analysis of the G.P.A. is an essential precondition for the implementation of effective strategies of intervention.

The present study is also distinctive in the following ways. Firstly, it examines inefficiency in relation to bureaucracy, taking the latter to be an organisational structure. (Weberian view) and not as a factor which leads inevitably to inefficiency. Secondly, in the same context, in other words in relation to bureaucracy, '*rouspeti*' and party political involvement are considered. Thirdly, this study is supported by empirical evidence from interviews with public servants and trade unionists.

Having outlined the aims, objectives and context of the thesis, I will now turn to an elaboration of the methodology used in data collection in the G.P.A.

1.2. **Methodology**

To collect my data I conducted research at the Ministry of Education and Religion, the central service and the regional service. This particular Ministry was chosen because access would be easier and protracted negotiations would be avoided. This was because I had worked for this particular Ministry for fifteen years. Indeed it was as a result of this employment that I had been stimulated to conduct this study. I considered this area to be a challenging one and I wanted to verify my aims in relation to employees who had also been experienced in the same area of the G.P.A.

From my experience as an employee in the G.P.A. I would say that there are no particular differences in the way that other Ministries operate or in the way that the personnel of those Ministries perceive the issues under consideration. Therefore, I had no reason to believe that my sample was not a typical part of the G.P.A. as a whole.

The choice of methodology was directed by the past success of qualitative methods in the organisation studies field (e.g.: Collinson 1981, 1988a; Knights and Collinson 1985, 1987). People were interviewed in a flexible way, requiring the interviewer to practice delicate handling, patience and humour while gathering important information for the study. The choice of this methodology was shaped by the sort of issue that the research sought to explore - i.e. informal practices, subjective experience, workplace culture and the "social" relations of bureaucratic

organisation. A static and inflexible questionnaire survey would not have adequately explored such questions, to the extent that such methods predetermine and circumscribe the type of responses which they secure. To explore workplace relations, experience, culture and practices and more flexible, less formal and more open-ended methodology was required. Hence, my methods were shaped by the theories and the questions with which I began my research.

This qualitative approach was, however, not wholly unstructured. It was based on a questionnaire which highlighted some of the key issues. Yet, beyond this framework according to the flow of the discussion. That gave me the flexibility to reach my aim by various means. Also, the interviewees were not interrupted in order to be asked certain questions at certain points, thus, they could integrate their thoughts and their talk which sometimes led to important issues being raised that I had not previously considered. Furthermore, direct contrast with the interviewee and the flexibility of the questionnaire generated a friendly atmosphere rather than a formally deliberate and constrained discussion. This climate was comfortable for both the interviewee and the interviewer and allowed some hidden feelings to be revealed such as suspicion of the purpose of the interview or a kind of fear about what had been said during the discussion. Indeed the defensiveness of interviewees was a recurrent and unanticipated finding that emerged in conducting the research. This is illustrated by the following examples.

A manager of a service did not object to me interviewing his subordinates, but he insisted that he be the first interviewee. His interests in my work and his insistence that he should be first to be interviewed reflected his suspicion about "what all this work was about" and how "dangerous" it could be for the reputation of the service. This feeling which emerged from the contact we had before the interview fortunately had turned into 'approval' at the end of the interview. The whole process of the interview and the fact that I promised confidentiality, established trust.

Also, most of the interviewees asked me to provide a general review of my questionnaire before they would consent to being interviewed. It gave me the idea that they were suspicious about "what was going on".

Another interviewee revealed her defensiveness by asking to take the tape that we had used for the interview, with her to play it in the afternoon. She would like, she said, to listen to her voice and to check how correctly she had spoken in front of a tape recorder. I suspect that this was an excuse for her to take the tape and be sure that whatever she said could not cause any damage to her if the interview were to be used for other reasons.

Some of the other respondents, after we had finished the interview, asked me to play back the tape to "listen to their voices". I think their rationalization showed the same reason as the previous interviewee who had asked to take the tape with her; in other words it was a matter of

defensiveness. What did emerge during the research was that lower level employees were less anxious about their responses than those in the higher level positions. This extensive degree of defensiveness merely in conducting the research was an important indicator of problems within the social relations of the G.P.A. Again this finding was unlikely to have emerged using the more formal methods of questionnaire systems.

Some interviewees tried to take advantage of the friendly atmosphere to ask me to play the tapes of interviews with their superiors, but they were always told that interviews were confidential. On the one hand they were disappointed not to be informed of their superiors' more personal thoughts; on the other hand they felt more comfortable when they responded because confidentiality had been shown to be implemented.

Unlike the employees who pretended that their work was important and so pressing that they really could not be interviewed, there were others who asked desperately to discuss things with me. It is worth noting that an employee of the lowest hierarchical level wanted to be interviewed thinking that I was going to publish my information, a he stated: "I would like to tell you everything about how the superiors order us to do this and that and they are not concerned about our working conditions." He elaborated some of the problems their administrative class had, such as securing a room to work in. Then he ended up: ".....there is no sympathy or interest for the lowest-grade employees. You must be powerful to be heard....." He obviously

believed that through a research interview with me he could be heard and perhaps find a solution to his persistent problems. Some saw me as an opportunity to give 'voice' to their anxieties.

Sometimes employees left their posts to be interviewed considering that to be more important than to serve the clients for a while. They believed that the only way for the public administration to change was for more researchers to conduct studies and especially researchers from the body of the G.P.A. itself. Those examples serve to illustrate the sense of powerlessness often experienced by employees in the G.P.A.

However, despite many employees' obvious willingness to help my project and despite the friendly atmosphere, I could still feel that they hesitated to provide a completely accurate account of events. To my question: "what frightened them?" the answer given from most of them was identical. They highlighted the way that some superiors and peers would not tolerate the truth about the administration of the service although they knew it. They were content to entertain the idea that the administration was satisfactory. Therefore, any contrary opinion would challenge the taken-for-granted status quo and would create problems for those who expressed such an idea. Hence, defensiveness, in other words, again underlies the employees' hesitation to respond.

Another difficulty was the one about the party political interference in the administrative operation of the service. Although, most of the employees had little difficulty in speaking about informal groups sharing the same political convictions which influenced the

administrative functions, they refused to acknowledge that Political ideology influences general organisational behaviour. Nevertheless, most of them admitted that their friendships in the workplace started with colleagues of the same Political convictions. The way by which I found interviewees, also confirms the fact that relationships are mostly dependent on party-political affiliations.

From the discussion I had with an interviewee, she believed that I shared her political ideas. Thus, she introduced me to other colleagues who supported the same political party encouraging them to help me as being one of "*their's*".

Then I was to sent another colleague who supported the opposite political party. I soon realised that the idea was, on the one hand, to secure information from an "opposition" and on the other hand, to put her in the difficult situation of being interviewed during a pre-election period when the general situation in the G.P.A. was very tense. The reaction of this interviewee really shocked me and reinforced the idea that party-political affiliations were detrimental to the G.P.A. operation.

This interviewee expressed considerable defensiveness. She refused to utter a single word especially when I told her that I was intending to use a tape-recorder. Her fear was obvious. To my question: "why are you so frightened?" she answered that she did not want to move to another place or to another service because of this interview. She preferred to keep her own opinion to herself and nobody else, and that because, as

she said, the Political involvement in the administration is not only strong but, also, extremely harmful for officials with other ideological views.

Another technique I used to conduct interviewees was through acquaintances regardless of party-political convictions. Therefore, I gathered valuable information from an experienced manager and his subordinates to whom he introduced me, encouraging them to give me any help.

My last interviewees were some trade unionists from the central committee of the public servants trade union, who happily collaborated, giving me a lot of their spare time.

For convenience all interviews were tape-recorded. Using the tape recorder was sometimes the reason why employees revealed their fear about their responses being published. Indeed, there were three cases where employees would not allow me to use the machine nor to keep notes.

The semi-structured questionnaire used for the purpose of this study included questions about employees' personal details, organisational structure, environment, work conditions, relationships among employees, equal opportunities, political interference. The quotations which are used in this study are chosen as those which represent the widely held views of employees.

Among the forty (40) interviewees there were:

1 ex-top manager (Secretary "Specialist")

3 managers

5 supervisors

24 clerical staff of various grades

4 educational staff burden with administrative responsibilities.

3 trade unionists

Before finishing with the reference to the methodology, I would like to add that the fact that I worked for the G.P.A. for years, was, overall great advantage for me as a researcher. I was familiar with the practices, the procedures and the culture of the workplace. However, there were a few cases where it seemed to be less of an advantage. As I worked for the same Ministry, where the project was developing, it might have been a constraint for some employees to give me honest opinions. In addition to those interviews, my methodology drew on the analysis of various organisational documents and on careful consideration of the relevant public sector magazines, journals and other publication.

To summarise, the research methodology itself highlighted extensive interviewee defensiveness and suspicion. This defensiveness reflects the political nature of the G.P.A. and begins to illustrate, albeit in an indirect way, the source of the organisational problems of the G.P.A. which have been highlighted consistently by Greek commentators,

such as those who were discussed earlier. The analysis of the data collected through this methodology will be presented in chapters three, four and five. The names of the interviewees are false names, given by me in order to secure the confidentiality I had promised. Having described the aims and background context of the thesis and the methodological processes involved in conducting the research, the final section of this introduction now outlines the overall structure of the subsequent chapters of the thesis.

Footnote: I will use capital P for "politics" or "political when using the words in terms of policy, politics of government or political parties.

1.3 Structure of the Study

The **first chapter** considers Weber's contribution to our understanding of bureaucracy as the most adequate organisational structure applied in any kind of organisation from the military and churches to firms and States. It is especially introduced into big and complex organisation as it provides discipline and compliance through rationalization of the institutions, hierarchical structuring of authority and the creation of a chain of command, which in turn is seen to lead to efficiency.

The main element in bureaucratic theory is 'impersonality' which underlies every action and which prevents nepotism, favouritism and individual involvement in organisational procedures. Impersonality is mainly to be achieved through 'orders'. Impersonality also assures equality of treatment for all employees; regardless of the hierarchical level that they hold, they are subject to the same established rules and orders.

How employees in the G.P.A. treat bureaucracy and how bureaucracy is implemented in the G.P.A. will be considered in the **second chapter**. This chapter will seek to question whether bureaucracy in the G.P.A. is a term which better expresses the dysfunctions of bureaucracy than defines the term itself. In other words this chapter will apply the theories of Weber to the understanding of the G.P.A. In addition, it will also include a reference to the historical

development of the G.P.A. How and under what circumstances was the G.P.A. established? What factors have affected its evolution? Which of these factors have remained dominant from its establishment up until the present day giving at the same time, the answer to the question "why is the G.P.A. inefficient?"; does historical development confirm that party political involvement is defined as departing from Weberian bureaucracy?: all these will be stages of this excursion into the history of the G.P.A.

The following three chapters draw on empirical data. The **third chapter** examines '*rouspheti*' and demonstrates that it is interrelated with bureaucratic organisation in the G.P.A. This analysis will highlight the degree to which bureaucratic principles are affected by political involvement. By analyzing each one of the bureaucratic characteristics in relation to party political involvement, we will follow step by step their entire transformation from formal functions into powerful tools in the hands of the party in power and the Government which represents it. More than any other, this chapter reveals the way that ideal bureaucracy does not actually exist in the G.P.A.

The **fourth chapter** deals with the important function of managerial control in the operation of the organisation. It examines the way that managerial control is exercised and the relationship between control and bureaucratic organisations. The chapter also considers the extent to which managerial control is affected by political involvement and if it is, what the consequences are.

The response of employees to bureaucratic control is also highlighted in this chapter. Do employees resist? How do they express their resistance to inadequate managerial control? To these questions answers will be given through the responses of interviewees. The role of Public Sector Trade Unionism is also considered here as a potential source for collective resistance to inadequate management. Public servants' trade unionism is examined in the context of the social organisational environment and whether it is affected or not by Political involvement.

Finally, the **fifth chapter** discusses the empirical evidence which reinforces the view of the detrimental influence of '*rouspheti*' and party political involvement in the organisational culture of the G.P.A. It, also, examines the degree to which organisational culture is affected by the wider social culture, in which political affiliations tend to become the basic form of relationships. Furthermore, organisational culture is considered as a factor which contributes to the distortion of the ideal bureaucratic structure and allows inefficiency to grow. This chapter draws in particular on the work of Crozier and his study of bureaucracy in the context of French society.

The findings of this research are listed in the conclusion of the thesis. In the conclusion are, also included some suggestions in the case of a decision by the Political masters to transform the G.P.A.

CHAPTER I: Bureaucracy

1.1 Introduction

This chapter presents a theoretical exploration of the notion of bureaucracy drawing in particular on the work of Max Weber. The discussion is then broadened to include other theorists of bureaucracy before criticism of these theories is reviewed.

Overall, the chapter seeks to identify the relationship between bureaucracy and power, bureaucracy and Politics, bureaucracy and employees as well as bureaucracy and clients. This examination thereby seeks to introduce the theoretical context in which this study was developed.

1.2 What is bureaucracy?

A great deal of our experience of modern society as Clegg (1990) argues is based on organisations. "Without a plurality of complex organisations there would be no possibilities of civility and citizenship, because it is only through organisational representation that the majority of people can achieve any form of interest articulation in a large scale, modern and mass society. Unions, parties, councils ... are the means through which we participate in modernity... Public life is organisational life for most people." (Clegg 1990, p.5) In order to function most organisations are structured along bureaucratic principles.

Academics have studied bureaucracy from a number of different social science disciplines such as sociology, economics and politics. However the main stimulus and seminal work for the study of bureaucracy comes from the German sociologist Max Weber who locates bureaucracy in the context of economic systems. Bureaucracy according to him can be developed in any economic system as it does not make any difference whether the economic system is organised on a capitalist or a socialist basis. (p.337) However, he emphasizes that because of "its specific nature" bureaucracy is welcome by capitalism" (Weber 1948, p. 215). To this extent he delimits the context within which bureaucracy has developed.

The word bureaucracy as Clegg and Dunkerley (1980) report, is ascribed to the Frenchman de Cour.n.a.y (1712-1759) who in the term "bureau", meaning writing-table and office, added the Greek suffix for "rule", in order to define bureaucracy as the rule of officials. This suffix, "cracy", which derives from the Greek "Kratia", gives bureaucracy its nature of power. The pejorative connotations of the word are, also, ascribed to a Frenchman. He is the novelist Honore de Balzac who used the term negatively in his novel "Les Employe's" (1836) (Martin Albow 1970).

Whatever is the derivation of the word, it is to Weber one most first refer when considering the development of the concept. It is Weber's rational theory whose basic tenets are accepted by all major schools of organisation theory, such as the classical, human relation and humanist.

Bureaucracy for Weber is a mode of organisation, which requires an administrative staff and a leader. The basic characteristics for an organisation to be classified as bureaucratic are:

- "1. (officials) are personally free and subject to authority only with respect to their impersonal official obligations.
2. They are organised in a clearly defined hierarchy of offices.
3. Each office has a clearly defined sphere of competence in the legal sense.

4. The office is filled by a free contractual relationship. Thus, in principle, there is free selection.
5. Candidates are selected on the basis of technical qualifications. In the most rational case, this is tested by examination of guaranteed by diplomas certifying technical training, or both. They are appointed, not elected.
6. They are remunerated by fixed salaries in money, for the most part with a right to pensions... The salary scale is primarily graded according to rank in the hierarchy; but in addition to this criterion, the responsibility of the position and the requirements of the incumbent's social status way to be taken into account.
7. The office is treated as the sole, or at least the primary, occupations of the incumbent.
8. It constitutes a career. There is a system of 'promotion' according to seniority or to achievement, or both Promotion is dependent on the judgement of superiors.
9. The official works entirely separated from ownership of the means of administration and without appropriation of his position.
10. He is subject to strict and systematic discipline and control in the conduct of the office". (D. S. Pugh 1984, p. 20-21)

In Weber's theory there are three predominant elements which characterize bureaucracy namely rationality, rules and impersonality.

Each of these notions are a precondition for organisational efficiency, which is the primary objective of the bureaucratic organisational structure. I will now discuss each of these key bureaucratic elements in turn.

"By **rationality** Weber seems to mean that kind of action or mode of organizing in which goals are clearly conceived and all conduct except that designed to achieve the particular goal is eliminated." State Francis and Stone (1956, in M Albrow 1970, p.62) while N. Mouzelis (1967, p.51) remarks that "In the Weberian sense, rationality implies the appropriateness of means to ends. In the bureaucratic context this means efficiency."

However, Morgan (1986) believes that rationality for Weber is the logic driving modern societies. It is also the response to "demands" of the modern cultures. (Clegg and Dunkerley 1980). "The peculiarity of modern culture, and specifically of its technical and economic basis, demands this very "calculability" of results. ...Today it is primarily the capitalist market economy which demands the official business of the administration be discharged precisely, unambiguously, continuously, and with as much speed as possible." Says Weber (in Clegg and Dunkerley 1980 p.80).

Therefore, rationality is a unique characteristic of Western civilization which is "distinguished from every other by the presence of

a man with a rational ethic for the conduct of life." (Weber in Clegg and Dunkerley 1980 p. 34) It is, also, related to the free capitalist market. Because of that all the values gradually became more materialistic. Labour is no longer measured in terms of social and honorific value but in terms of a means which contributes to a profitable enterprise. Then follows the rationality of "ends", whose achievement requires rational technology. It, in turn, entails a progressive extension of the division of labour and specialisation. The next step in this process is the rational management which is required in order for efficiency to be gained and the goal set to be attained.

This rational management becomes an increasingly dominating process through "rules" and it makes people "engage in strict calculations relating means and ends and costs and benefits.... Impersonal principles and the quest for efficiency tend to become our new slave drivers." (Morgan 1986 p.278) Thus, "for Weber the process of rationalisation is itself a mode of domination." (Morgan 1986, p. 278).

In pursuit of efficiency, these processes of rationality must be accepted by or imposed on the members of the organisation. Within a bureaucracy, as has been mentioned, this is best achieved through the creation of a set of rules.

The rules lay down the hierarchy of offices in the bureaucracy and specify the rights and the duties of each official. These "consciously

made rational rules (which may be agreed upon or imposed from above)" have to "meet with obedience as generally binding norms whenever such obedience is claimed by him whom the rule designates. In that case every single bearer of power of command is legitimated by the system of rational norms and his power is legitimate insofar as it corresponds with the norm. Obedience is thus given to the norms rather than to the person." (Weber in J. Miner 1982, p.388)

The administrative staff have to regulate behaviour by these rules. As constituting a ruling body they also have to check the adherence of the other members to the rules of the organisation. "Members of the organisation tend to obey these rules because of their belief that they are subject to an "order governing the organisation " which was regarded by Weber as a "structure of dominancy" (Clegg and Dunkerley, 1980,p.77).

The "order of governing" is based on three different types of authority: the charismatic, the traditional and the rational - legal. Obedience to charismatic authority is premised upon the sacred or extraordinary characteristics of the person giving the order. Traditional authority bases its power on the notion of lineage or primogeniture - i.e. authority is inherited. The third and most powerful form of authority generates obedience because of people's "belief that the person giving the order was acting in accordance with the duties stipulated in a code of legal rules and regulations." (Clegg 1990 p.35)

As Clegg (1990) points out (following Albrow 1970), the latter form of obedience depends on five beliefs:

"1. that a legal code can be established which can claim obedience from members of the organisation;

2. that the law is a system of abstract rules; these rules are applied to particular cases, and the administration looks after the interests of the organisation within the limits of the law;

3. that the man exercising authority also obeys this impersonal order;

4. that only qua member does the member obey the law;

5. that obedience is due not to the person who holds authority but to the impersonal order which has granted his/her this position." (p.35).

The implementation of rational principles through explicit rules and regulations is contingent upon the third primary characteristic of bureaucracy namely impersonality. Bureaucracy is impersonal as administrators who are loyal to the system, not to individuals, or family or clan, practice their rationally validated skills regardless of context. "Everyone is subject to formal equality of treatment, says Weber. This is the spirit in which the ideal official conducts his business." (D. Buchanan and A. Huczynski 1985, p. 319) Rules are the means which serve and secure impersonality.

What does bureaucracy aim to achieve through rationalization, explicit rules and impersonality? Efficiency, is the answer and that is, at the same time, the key which unlocks the doors of modern society to bureaucracy. Weber himself declares: "Experience tends universally to show that the purely bureaucratic type of organisation ... is from a purely technical point of view, capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency ... " Later he repeats: "It is finally superior both in intensive efficiency and in the scope of its operation and is formally capable of application to all kinds of administrative tasks." (Weber 1947).

Thus according to Weber, bureaucracy is indispensable in modern society and in administration. Especially in the latter "the choice is only between bureaucracy and dilettantism". ...it would be sheer illusion to think for a moment that continuous administrative work can be carried out in any field except by means of officials working in offices." (D. Pugh 1984, p.24) Weber concludes that once a system of bureaucracy is established it is almost impossible to stop. "The decisive reason for the advance of bureaucratic organisation has always been its purely technical superiority over any other form of machine." (Weber 1948, p.214).

Bennis (1973) supports Weber's statement by arguing that the sun will never set on bureaucracies and that bureaucracy is inevitable and therefore necessary for governing large and complex organisations.

Furthermore, F. Heffron (1989) points out that "bureaucratic organisations are structured to maximize specialization and efficiency..." (p.182) while for R Kreitner (1986, p.245) "Weber's bureaucracy, in theory was supposedly the epitome of efficiency.

However, Charles Perrow treats bureaucracy as a moral project seeking thereby bureaucracy not only as efficient but also something desirable (Clegg 1990). C. Perrow (1986) claims that the morality of bureaucracy is embedded in the fact that it is against any kind of discrimination such as ethnicity, gender, age or religion. Bureaucracy promises equal treatment for the members of the organisation according solely to their official status, regardless of other aspects of their identity. As Clegg (1990) points out, the conception of bureaucracy as a moral project, such as Perrow advances it "is a liberal conception in all the very best sources of the term." It is such, because it insists that "one should be treated solely in terms of the rights, responsibilities, rules and duties appropriate to one's position as a member of the organisation. Whether one is black or white, red or green male or female, straight or gay, should be irrelevant." (p.5)

However Weber writes about bureaucracy in a sceptical way. In his later work, Weber regards the tendency to bureaucratization with a sort of "despair" and he did not hesitate to state that "it is horrible to think that the world could one day be filled with little cogs, little men

clinging to little jobs and striving towards bigger ones ... this passion for bureaucracy is enough to drive one to despair." (Weber, in Clegg 1990, p.30) This cry of despair constitutes the strongest criticism of bureaucracy, particularly since it comes from Weber himself. This is, also, one of a number of criticisms that bureaucracy has borne. A reference to those criticisms appears in the next section.

1.3. Critiques on Weber and Bureaucracy

Certain writers have adopted a more critical approach to bureaucratic organisation. For example Marx argued that bureaucracy was the apparatus formed and utilized by the ruling class in order to serve its own interests and to validate its domination. Within a society which is characterized by the existence of several social classes and which is based on exploitation bureaucracy is a primary means of coercion. For him, therefore, bureaucracy does not serve the general interest. The general interest is rather limited to the particular interest of bureaucracy which requires the perpetuation of spheres of interests of the unions and of social classes in order to present itself as an artificial generality. "Bureaucracy is condemned to deal with everything and to present an endless activity in order to cover the absence of real work." (C. Lefort, 1985)

In this respect bureaucracy is characterised in terms of the superiority of ritualism over the substance and the tendency of the organisation to become an end in itself and not an apparatus through which the goals set will be achieved. Thus, Marx assumes, that bureaucracy is a temporary phenomenon which will be eliminated along with the domination of capitalism, despite Weber's view that "socialism requires a higher degree of bureaucratization than capitalism" (Weber 1947 p.33)

However, Trotsky supporting Marx's view, believes that

bureaucracy "is a stratum or caste, parasitic upon socialist society" (M. Albrow 1970, p.16); is a temporary practical formation connected with a particular historical chance; is a fungus which is matured on the social body and which will be disassociated by a coming revolution. (C. Leffort, 1985)

Lenin insists that bureaucracy separates the mass from the state and makes mass participation impossible through the following characteristics:

- "1. appointment of officials who are neither elected nor have the responsibility of recall.
2. the high salaries and special privileges of officials, which concretely tie their interests to the bourgeoisie create an aura of "official grandeur" around them and place them "above the people" and
3. the restricted quality of bourgeois democracy, which separates legislation from administrative activity and prevents the activity of people in either

Thus bureaucracy which is connected with the bourgeoisie, would be unfit to carry out the orders of the proletarian state." (Er O. Wright 1978, p.200)

For Robert Michels bureaucracy is not only the means of coercion, as Marx believes, but the coercion itself. Bureaucracy, according to him, is a system of imposition of a numerically small class over the majority

of human beings. "Who says organisation, say oligarchy" states Michels (in M. Albrow 1970, p.36)

Yet, for Claude Lefort (1985) bureaucracy is considered as a grouping of people who tend to impose a concrete organisational form on society. His views seem to approach those of R Michels about the law of oligarchy. He links bureaucracy with power through the authoritative status of the bureaucrats who, according to him, desire to form an isolated group, which keeps its distance from the ruled. G. Lefort measures the degree of bureaucratization by the volume of the paper which is used in every day performance of an organisation.

All the preceding bureaucratic views seem to consider bureaucracy in terms of power, and control. However, there are numerous others which focus their criticism on fundamental bureaucratic values such as rationality, rules and impersonality and they face them critically in relation to efficiency.

R. Merton (1940) is one of those theorists who question the idea of rational bureaucracy. He believes that a rational structure in terms of Weber, "can easily generate consequences which are unexpected and detrimental to the attainment of an organization's objectives. Thus emphasis on precision and reliability in administration may well have self-defeating consequences. Rules, designed as means to ends, may well become ends in themselves. The graded career structure of the bureaucrat may encourage him to an excess of the virtue he is supposed to embody: prudence, discipline, method. Governed by similar work

conditions officials develop a group solidarity which may result in opposition to necessary change. Where officials are supposed to serve the public the very norms of impersonality which govern their behaviour may cause conflict with individual citizens." (M. Albrow 1970, p.55)

P. Blau (1974) focuses, also, on the dysfunctions of bureaucracy. He believes that Weber failed to recognise the dysfunctions that bureaucracy creates, such as the encouragement of less personally responsible behaviour. Weber focuses on the function of bureaucracy but he failed to deal with many problems of their workings. In promotion, Weber emphasises the use of objective and rational procedures but failed to deal with the value of merit and seniority. For Weber the major source of rational-legal authority was knowledge but Blau remarks that Weber failed to reckon with the value of professional life. (J Miner 1982) Blau considers, too, the orientation that the member of an organisation has towards the rules. Through research in two governmental agencies he found that the organisations were more efficient when members were consciously breaking the rules than following them. "The conclusion of Blau's thesis is that a fresh look has to be taken at the concept of rational administration. In a changing environment the stable attainment of organisational objectives depends on perpetual change in the bureaucratic structure. Therefore efficiency cannot be guaranteed by tethering the official to a set of rigid rules." (M. Albrow 1970, p.58)

Victor Thompson, also, deals with the dysfunctions and inadequacies of bureaucracy. For Thompson (1961), bureaucracy is an

artificial system and it constitutes a tool which carries out only the goals of its owner and not of other claimants such as the employees. Thompson considers artificial (bureaucratic) systems under-innovative, inflexible and unchangeable. Criticizing bureaucratic impersonality Thompson takes up the lack of sympathy and enthusiasm in bureaucracy and ends up by suggesting a bureaucratic system more compassionate and more sensitive to the needs of individuals. (J. Miner 1982)

Crozier emphasizes, too, the impersonality of the rules, as one of the basic elements of the bureaucratic vicious circle. ("Four basic elements seem to be necessary for the stability of the vicious circle we have observed: the extent of the development of impersonal rules; the centralization of decision; strata isolation and concomitant group pressure on the individual; and the development of parallel power relationships around remaining areas of uncertainty." (Crozier 1965 p.254) Because everything in an organisational process is delimited by rules, rules for job specification, rules for job allocation, rules for promotion, "nothing seems to be left for the arbitrary whim and individual initiative of an organisation member." (Crozier 1965, p.255) There is, therefore a high degree of predictability of employees' behaviour which, in turn, leads to a decline in the hierarchical dependence relationships.

The role of superiors is limited to the monitoring of the implementation of the rules in as much as they cannot interfere with work performance, instructing employees (everything is set by rules) nor

employees career development (in French public administration promotion is based on competitive examinations). Both factors weaken the power of superiors over the employees while on the other hand they weaken the employees' bargaining power over superiors. As a consequence, superiors and subordinates adopt a rapport on a conventional basis which lacks emotional commitment. The result of such a system is a slowdown of work flow "as a way of expressing the fact that rules cannot take care of everything and that management must rely on workers' support and must therefore bargain for it." (Crozier 1965, p.256).

Considering the rules from another perspective Gouldner (1975) notices that the proliferation of the impersonal bureaucratic rules diminishes the tension which close supervision creates. However, on the other hand, the poor performance which results from the implementation of the impersonal rules leads to the need for close supervision. Gouldner goes further and connects rationality, legality and hierarchy. Rationality, as he argues, implies that acts are undertaken for a certain reason, to attain a certain goal. However, when behaviour is determined by certain rules which enforce unquestioning obedience to superiors, the member does not behave "rationally", he/she simply obeys, as he/she does not have a clear picture of ends and means guiding the action. Therefore rationality seems to be the system which requires non-rational behaviour by members.

Gouldner believes that the meaning of the rule depends on the context of their enactment. To this extent, bureaucracy appears under three types: The **mock** bureaucracy, when none of the members of an organisation, neither managers nor employees accept the legitimacy of the rules which are imposed on them by an external force. The **representative** bureaucracy when "all parties to the organisation accept not only the legitimacy of the rules, but also the legitimacy of managers imposing and workers accepted them" (Clegg 1990). The **punishment-centred** bureaucracy where "the rules are enforced by either one party or the other, that is by either management or the workers, while the other party seeks to avoid them." (Clegg 1990). As Clegg (1990) argues, Gouldner's emphasis on rules shows that the same objective bureaucracy under different circumstances (different people in different contexts at different times) may transform the rules and through them change the tendencies and the type of bureaucratization.

When Weber "spoke of rationality and bureaucracy he was talking about efficiency" (M. Albrow 1970, p.62) However, various theorists reject the idea that bureaucratic organisations are necessarily the most efficient. The concept of efficiency seems to be quite ambiguous. Albrow (1970), remarks that "It would be quite misleading to equate Weber's concept of formal rationality with the idea of efficiency." (p.63). In other words, Weber's idea about "technical formal rationality" does not necessarily mean efficiency.

Efficiency is linked with the achievement of ends in an organisation. However, ends cannot be strictly defined without the possibility that different members conceive the ends differently (Gouldner 1975). Therefore, even if one identifies irrefutably a most efficient mode of achieving a result, the result itself is likely to be open to dispute.

Furthermore, experience suggests that when human beings are obliged to engage in only one activity with no alternative (routinization and repetition) and to that like "machines", then inefficiency creeps in. The reaction to such situations, as most evidence suggests, is usually slow working or sabotage (M. Benyon 1973, 75). Also absenteeism and conflicts are likely to be high in organisations with a highly bureaucratic character. That is proved by Elton Mayo (1949) who according to the scientific management school expected workers to operate their machine highly productively all of their working hours. What he found was that workers under such conditions showed high rates of absenteeism and a high tendency to staff turnover was noticed. When the conditions changed and employees had rest periods and time for contact with colleagues, productivity increased and absenteeism and staff turnover was reduced. The same idea is reinforced by Gouldner's (1975) research in the gypsum mine and factory, where the enforcement of strict bureaucratization led a previously peaceful and successful factory to a wildcat strike.

However, "human beings" says Morgan (1986), "have a knack of getting trapped in a web of their own creation." (p.199). It can be argued here that people in modern societies have trapped themselves in the "iron cage" of bureaucracy. By adopting the TINA (there is no alternative) idea and in the name of efficiency they found themselves locked in bureaucracies. (Clegg 1990). Bureaucracy promised efficiency, through precision, speed and unambiguity and fascinated modern society with its simplicity and the success it offers. It became superior over every other organisational form. "The fully developed bureaucratic apparatus compares with other organisations exactly as does the machine with the non-mechanical modes of production." (Weber 1948). The magic word is "machine" and it seems to act determinately in the industrialized world inasmuch as it constitutes the basis of progress and capitalistic development.

Mechanistic ways of thinking, or living, however, result in transforming and distorting human nature. "He who does his work like a machine, and he who grows a heart of a machine in his breast loses his simplicity. He who has lost his simplicity becomes unsure in the striving of his soul." says an old Chinese man to somebody who advised him to use a mechanistic way to irrigate his garden. (Morgan 1986)

The above quotation rings true in modern society. "The modern world was, by definition an age of uncertainty" states Clegg (1990, p.32). However, Weber tries to surpass this by stating that bureaucracy through its mechanism and principles works for individual members

freeing them from the inequities of arbitrary authority. He does not imply satisfaction or happiness for the member of the organisation but he replaces that with equal treatment which prevents them from harm or personal friction. He offers rationality as a basis for meritocracy. But his scepticism betrays him when he reveals that the bureaucratic approach has the potentiality to routinize and mechanize every aspect of human life, eroding the human spirit and its capacity for spontaneous action. This is the point on which Humanist theorists put emphasis, disputing bureaucratic superiority and expressing disenchantment with it.

As W. Bennis (1970) states: "The bureaucratic form of organisation is becoming less and less effective it is hopelessly out of joint with contemporary realities Bureaucracy does not adequately allow for personal growth and the development of mature personalities.

It develops conformity and "group thinking". It does not take into account the "informal organisation" and the emergent and anticipated problems.

Its system of control and authority are hopelessly outdated.

It has no adequate juridical process.

It does not possess adequate means for resolving differences and conflicts between ranks and most particularly between functional group.

Communication (and innovative ideas) are thwarted or distorted owing to hierarchical divisions.

The full human resources of bureaucracy are not utilized owing to

mistrust and fear of reprisal. It cannot assimilate the influx of new technology or scientists entering the organisation.

It modifies personality structure so that people become and reflect the dull grey conditioned "organisational man." (p.3-6).

This strong criticism manifests humanists' faith in human beings and their aim to develop human-centred organisations which fulfil the needs and wants of human personality. Their perspective, however, led some critics to accuse humanism of being "the people without organisation" approach in contradiction to what in classical theory is considered as "the organisation without people approach."

"Formal rational organisations are based on reducing tasks to minimal specialised routines" says G. Argyris (Pugh, Hickson, Hinings 1983). According to him, such an environment is not suitable for an individual to progress from infantile behaviour. The employee adopts a myopic view limited to the end of the day's work, unable to see further in long term the performance of the organisation as a whole. He/she is entrenched by rules and defined tasks and is not interested in the possibility of anything more than that. He/she accepts passively the position without initiatives. (Pugh, Hickson, Hinings 1983). This widespread work apathy and lack of effort along with passivity and dependence especially among the lower-level employees are phenomena of immaturity, advocates Argyris, and he believes that if employees keep behaving immaturely within an organisation it is because they are expected to behave in this way. The whole environment is formed in

such a way as not to allow employees maturity (P. Buchanan, 1985).

Besides maturity, in bureaucracies, members adopt mindless and unquestioning attitudes which they express by saying "it is not my job to worry about that" or "I'm here to do what I'm told." These are not the attitudes of employees, states Morgan (1986) , these are inherent traits in the mechanistic approach to organisation. "Defining work responsibilities in a clear-cut manner has the advantage of letting anyone know what is not expected of them. But it also lets them know what is not expected of them." (G. Morgan, 1986, p. 36).

According to Morgan, bureaucracy, also, encourages people to obey orders while discouraging initiatives. This unquestioning obedience to orders works as a justification to employees who make deliberate mistakes on the premise that they are obeying orders. Apathy, as a result of people's feeling of powerlessness in the face of problems, carelessness and lack of pride are also consequences of the mechanistic approach. This approach seems to limit the development of human capacities trying to fit people in the organisation rather than the opposite. In this very way, people lose their life working without satisfaction while organisations are deprived from human creativity and ingenuity. They operate a system of incompetence where the employees of the lower positions leave the initiatives to those in the higher and in reverse the latter expect the former to deal with specific problems which are remote from their general sphere of competence. (Marx's view in C. Lefort 1985).

Job dissatisfaction leads the bureaucrat to be preoccupied only with the pursuit of the highest hierarchical position, converting the work itself to an apparatus for the preservation of his status within the organisation. (C. Lefort 1985). That means that the bureaucrat has different goals from those of the organisation, a fact which proves the value of the inapplicable "substantial discipline" in bureaucracies. It also shows the desire for power and control, as authority is associated with the position one holds. (Morgan 1986). In this sense bureaucracy appears as a network of personal relationships of dependence while in addition a creation of cliques appears whose conflicts include those of the formal hierarchy and tend continuously to restructure it according to their demands. (C. Lefort 1985).

However, bureaucrats in their transaction with clients appear to be unsociable. This unsociable behaviour of employees is considered by some theorists as a reaction against the mechanistic framework imposed on them. It is believed that the formalization and strict discipline work on the personality to produce resistance and resentment. These in turn lead to enforcement of oppressive methods and procedures with respect to serving clients or with respect to employees' function within the organisation. (Athanasopoulos 1983).

Hummel's research into efficiency in bureaucracies led him to question "how efficiency is emphasized in bureaucracies to the point of creating emotionless bureaucrats and frustration among clients who resent being shuffled around like numbers." While Kreitner argues that

"what may in fact be a bureaucracy's well-oiled efficiency is often perceived as inefficiency by clients and customers who see their cases passed from one coldly impersonal specialist to another." (R. Kreitner, p.247).

Rigidity in employees' behaviour seems to be another factor which leads to conflict with clients. This rigidity of employees derives from their attempt to follow the rules precisely. As Cherrington (1989) remarks, whereas wise bureaucrats know when to deviate from the rules and accept responsibility for any decision they reach, the others, who are afraid of undertaking responsibilities seek to protect themselves by following the rules precisely. (Merton 1940). The latter unable to use the discretion of the law or the authority of the position they hold and therefore they are particularly insensitive to individual problems, sticking to the rules and their behaviour generates difficulty with clients. According to Cherrington (1989) the more the clients complain and demand individual treatment the more strictly the bureaucrats follow the rules.

The inadequate relationships between bureaucrats and clients gives bureaucracy a bad reputation. The bureaucratic dysfunction which appear in everyday transactions are unable to be corrected, as bureaucracies are characterized as the organisation which "cannot correct their behaviour by their errors." (Crozier 1965, p.254). As far as their members are concerned bureaucracies seem to routinize and alienate their members' life by defining their overall behaviour starting from

their smile towards the clients and reaching ever the way they must be dressed. (Morgan 1986).

In conclusion, one can say that bureaucracy has been attacked by several theorists, who while criticizing its advantages suggest that they are at the same time its great disadvantages. Although bureaucracy seems to be the most appropriate mode of administration for large organisations, it is doubtful if it entails efficiency. Furthermore, its rationality is in doubt if only to the extent that the rules do not seem to cover any contingency". (Clegg and Dunkerley 1980, p.168). The consequence of bureaucracy on employees' and clients' lives seems to be detrimental, as it has the tendency to treat individuals as automatons. Bureaucracy can do so because it has power and control over its members. This will be the discussion in the next section.

1.4. Bureaucracy - Power and Politics

Bureaucracy incorporates a theory of power. At least, that is shown by the way nearly all theorists have accepted the broad definition of power given by Weber according to which: "Power is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance and regardless of the basis on which this probability rests." (Weber 1947, in S. Bacharach E. Lawler 1981, p.16).

However, power is considered by the various theorists in different perspectives with subtle or not-so-subtle deviations from the basic idea.

Therefore Blau (1964) defines power as "the ability of persons or groups to impose their will on others despite resistance through difference either in the form of withholding regularly supplied rewards or in the form of punishment inasmuch as the former, as well, as the latter, constitutes in effect negative sanction." For Mechanic (1962) Power is "a force that results in behaviour that would not have occurred if the forces had not been present." Kaplan (1964) however, sees power as the ability of one person or group of persons to influence the behaviour of others, that is, to change the probabilities that others will respond in certain ways to specified stimuli." While Dahl (1957) states that: "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that he would not otherwise do."

The above definitions introduce power in an interactive situation

and so they are consistent with the Weberian theory of power which, also, considers it in an interactionist perspective.

Parson, however defines power in relation to authority: "...power and authority would more likely be viewed as dual structures, both simultaneously present, in subtle and continual interaction. Power, in short, exists not simply when authority breaks down, or before authority has had a chance to mature. It exists as a factor in the lives of subordinates, shaping their behaviour and beliefs, at every moment of their relations with those above them... Legitimacy and authority never eliminate power; they merely defocalize it, make it latent." (Goulder 1971, p.234).

Therefore, while power is the capacity of a person or a group to secure compliance from another person or group, authority, as Weber and other theorists believe, is the right to secure compliance. However, for a ruler the use of this right depends on his or her ability to find support or legislation in the beliefs of the ruled (Morgan 1986). In this sense authority is defined as legitimate power and is backed by legitimacy. (Cherrington 1989).

Legitimacy, however, implies that subordinates not only accept the authority of the superior but, also, "the rationale or justification (explicit or implicit) for attaching authority to certain positions and occupants." (Bacharach and Lawler 1980, p.39). That appears in organisations with the structure of the organisational hierarchy where at each level supervisors are expected to influence the behaviour of their subordinates

while they are expected in turn to respond to the influence of those above them. To this extent the flow of influence from the top of hierarchy downwards, which implies power of superiors over the subordinates, constitutes the authority structure. Authority requires obedience, and from recent research (St. Milgram 1973) it has been highlighted that there is a high tendency for individuals to comply with legitimate authority. "Individuals had been taught to obey people in authority as part of the basic socialization process." States Cherrington (1989, p.703) while, he also remarks that "obedience is necessary for continued membership. If they refuse to comply with the accepted rules and norms, they can be expelled from the organisation (p.703).

French and Raven (1959) indicate five possible bases of power: coercion, rewards, expertise, legitimacy and referent power. Legitimacy has already been mentioned as the authority-power based on the right of the superior to impose her/his will to subordinates and to require obedience by them. Focusing on the other bases of power one could characterize referent power as the interpersonal power based on identification with others and it is mostly linked with charismatic authority.

Coercion and rewards are connected with punitive aspects of power and whereas "coercion" means "the threat of decreasing another's outcomes" reward is "the promise of increasing those outcomes." (Bacharach and Lawler 1980, p.33) Reward and coercion are related to conformity within bureaucracy and operate through control. In the past

conformity was obtained in a harsh and direct way, but in modern organisations it is achieved in more sophisticated ways, such as through education. As has been mentioned above "people have been taught to obey..."

"...through their education, have already internalized a number of basic conformities and a general ability to conform easily to an organisation's way." states "Crozier (1965, p.251). Furthermore, according to him, because nowadays human behaviour is better understood and therefore more predictable, modern organisations use more indirect and intellectual means of conformity.

Expertise is another main source of power in bureaucracy, and implies the specialized knowledge, the "technical" knowledge about the various activities within an organisation. This is, also, what gives a prestige to the status of bureaucrat.

"The political master always finds himself vis-a-vis the trained official, in the position of a dilettante facing the expert." says Weber (1947). However, the knowledge which is related to specific issues or is connected with certain skills is a source of power only if there is a critical need for the expert that can not be obtained somewhere else. In this sense, expertise to maintain a source of power requires a continuous training of the expert in order to improve the knowledge and the skills according to demands. (Cherrington 1989).

"The progressively increasing power of bureaucracies and bureaucrats" states E. Wright (1978) "grows out of several interconnected

characteristics of bureaucratic organisations: (1) the practical effectiveness and increasing indispensability of bureaucratic organisations, (2) the expert technical knowledge controlled by the bureaucrats and (3) the "administrative secrets" (knowledge about the inner workings of the bureaucracy) controlled by bureaucrats. This last element is especially important. Outsiders are in a weak position not merely because of the technical expertise of the bureaucrats but because of the bureaucratic control of files, information and procedures." (E.O. Wright 1978, p.185).

In addition to the five bases of power reported above, another one was added later by Raven, (1974); Raven and Kruglanski; (1970) namely information. "This consists of the access or opportunity actors have to gain information about the inner workings of the organisation or about the relation of the organisation to the environment. This information may or may not be related to the actor's level in the hierarchy of authority." (Bacharach and Lawler 1980, p.33). This newly-appeared power, whose establishment as a base of power, seems to have a relation with the advance of technology (use of computers), can be found even in low hierarchical level subordinates (secretaries.) Therefore, effective use of this element by subordinates, reinforces their status in the organisation giving them much more power than could be expected for the official post they hold.

Perhaps, this last basis of power underlies the "taking power" which Bacharach and Lawler (1980) introduce in their work. As they

remark organisational studies have neglected the possibility that subordinates will take power that given to them in the organisational structure. This particular power, the "talking power" seems to appear in the extent that organisation is considered as a political model. "Individuals and subgroups within organisations are not passive recipients awaiting the downward trickle of power but rather active participants mobilizing power for their own ends." (Bacharach and Lawler 1980, p.42).

As I will elaborate later, this "taking power" from the point of view of the G.P.A. is obtained through individuals' and groups' Political affiliations. This tendency of employees in organisations, especially in State bureaucracies, explains to a degree why Political involvement is determined in some bureaucracies. Backed by Political affiliations subordinates especially, draw power by participating in the decision-making through informal procedures, using the formal organisational structure as the means to legitimize the informalities. This phenomenon appears stronger when cultural traits reinforce the employees' tendency of "taking power". The findings of this research, which will be presented in later chapters, support the idea of Bacharach and Lawler (1980).

Another question, also, emerges in this point; whether or not there is a relation between bureaucracy and Politics. Woodrow Wilson was a strong advocate of the dichotomy between Politics and Administration: "The field of administration is a field of business. Administration lies outside the sphere of politics. Administrative

questions are not political questions." he states. (Woodrow Wilson in G. Peters, 1978.p.4) For him Politics and the nature of political systems had no impact in organisational structure as being too separable from administration. This view is consistent with the bureaucratic one which attributes a kind of neutrality to bureaucracy as being able to serve, equally successfully every political system.

On the contrary, recent theoretical approaches, such as "the power and politics school" approach, view organisations "as political systems permeated with conflict and power struggles to determine who gets what, when and how." (F. Heffron 1989). Especially when the reference is to the public sector, administration can never be divorced from Politics, remarks F. Heffron.

Lenin also places an emphasis on the link of State bureaucracy with Politics. The State bureaucracy for him is the target of the continuous struggle of the main political parties in order to possess the administrative positions.

Guy Peters (1978) dealing with Public administration, argues that administration is intimately involved with a variety of political actors and political acts and he believes that it operates in a political arena. According to him this linkage is expressed by the participation of Public Administration in the Public Policy while in the formulation of the Public policy the political system is involved. He, also, bounds administration with responsibility when "their style in handling clients, the courtesy and consideration they show, as well as their competence can do a great deal

toward defining the role and the respect of the political system in the society: (G. Peters 1978, p.12).

From another perspective, Clegg (1990) signifies in Weberian terms the relation between bureaucracy and Politics. "The Political leader is engaged in a struggle for power... In order to exercise power in the pursuit of such ultimate values the political leader must be able to call upon a reliable administrative staff as an instrument of authority.

This involves a bureaucracy. Members of this bureaucracy must prove themselves by impartial performance, while political leadership proves itself in the competition of votes during elections...". (Clegg 1990, p.37).

In this sense bureaucratic organisation as Clegg remarks "is simply a tool in the hands of political masters." But that is the 'ideal' which is rarely attained in the practice.

Subsequent chapters of this thesis will discuss the way in which bureaucratic principles, as they are established in the G.P.A. actually operate in practice.

1.5 Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed several of the major theories of bureaucracy available in sociological literature. Bureaucracy not only dominates organisational life in late twentieth century society, it, also contains several important paradoxes.

Its first paradox is that while bureaucracy appears to promise efficiency, in practice it contains a great deal of negative connotations and is often associated with inefficiency. The second paradox derives from the rules which constitute the foundation stone of bureaucracy. The creators of the rules are at the same time subject to the rules they create.

Most organisational theorists, regardless of their political views, regard bureaucracy as inevitable. What makes it so is its simplicity in use and the speed and precision of its procedures but also the way it transmits power and allocates authority. Rules are at the same time the advantages and disadvantages of bureaucracy. They on the one hand secure equal treatment of employees while on the other hand provide those in power with extensive control. Rules, then are rather imposed on employees than argued through dialogue. Bureaucracy, according to Weber and his supporters when it starts never stops.

Bureaucracy has been criticized for the mechanistic way it operates and for its impact on the lives of its members and clients. Despite its advantages, such as equal treatment of all employees, it is

evident that bureaucracy neglects the potentialities of the human personality, restricting the chances for initiatives and therefore creativity. Bureaucracy tends to create and maintain immature people with no imagination, defined actions and rigid behaviour. It also enforces them to an unconscious discipline which in turn generates resentment and resistance and develops forms of unwillingness for collaboration, symptoms which emerge in the every day conduct of bureaucrats with clients. Bureaucracy seems to deprive its members of "ideals" and values which make their work meaningful.

The domination of bureaucracy on public organisations reveals the link of bureaucracy with Politics. In this sense, bureaucracy obtains much more power as it plays a decisive role in the society. As Hegel advocates, bureaucracy is the bridge between the state and its citizens. It is the factor which through routine practices and its members' behaviour greatly affects the creation of the image of the state.

However, there is a great number of theorists who do not accept the relation of bureaucracy with Politics, believing that they are two separate spheres. Nevertheless, recent organisational approaches take account of Politics, in a broader perspective when considering bureaucracy.

The area which seems to be neglected by the above longstanding debate is the way in which Political factors interrelate with bureaucratic structures within the workplace. The findings presented in the following chapters will seek to contribute to this debate by highlighting and

analyzing the relationship between Politics and Bureaucracy in the G.P.A.

The significance of Politics in the G.P.A. is the factor highlighted by subsequent chapters which focus on control and culture within G.P.A.

CHAPTER II : Bureaucracy and Greek Public Administration

II.1 Introduction

This chapter considers the central bureaucratic characteristics of the G.P.A. In the preceding chapter bureaucracy was defined as the most widely applied organisational form in our modern society. It has also already been mentioned that because of its nature, bureaucracy is the basic form which states use to organize their public administration.

Therefore, in this chapter, the bureaucratic structure of the G..P.A. is considered along with its peculiarities. The way that the G.P.A. is structured as well as the way it expresses its bureaucratic tendencies is also highlighted. Interpretations for the peculiar bureaucratic model of the G.P.A. will be sought at the beginning in its historical development. In subsequent chapters explanations for the G.P.A.'s operation will also be sought in its organisational culture and in managerial control.

II.2 Is the G.P.A. bureaucratic?

2.a The formal structure of the G.P.A.

The G.P.A. seems to fulfil the bureaucratic principles as they have been described by Weber. Its formal structure reveals the existence of a state bureaucracy.

Adopting the view of Stasinopoulos (1957) we can define Public Administration to mean "whatever remains after the subtraction of legislative and judicial power"; in other words "...all the public services, where these public services are the ones embodied in the executive power of the state." (p.35) The public services are divided into central and regional services, not only because of their geographical position but also because of the nature of the service they provide and the range of responsibilities they bear.* The services belong to the various ministries, according to the sector they serve. There are twenty (20) ministries with different areas of responsibilities and services provided.

* The central services mainly provide counsel, planning and organisations which have territorial jurisdiction for the whole state, while the regional services carry out executive work, with territorial jurisdiction limited to specific administrative districts.

Every Ministry is headed by a Minister, who delegates responsibility for certain sectors to one or two Undersecretaries of State (they vary at every Ministry) by joint decision with the Prime Minister. Every Ministry also has a Secretary General appointed by Presidential Decree at the proposal of the Prime Minister and Responsible Minister with specific administrative responsibility. Some Ministries, such as the Ministry of National Education and Religion, have Secretaries as "Specialists" (top managers) who also have particular administrative responsibility.

The basic structural units in central Ministerial services are General Directorates, Services, Directorates and Divisions.* The number of units varies in every Ministry. In every unit there are relevant superiors. Therefore, there are Secretaries "Specialists" (top-managers) for the General Directorates, Directors (managers) for the services and the Directorates and Head of Divisions (supervisors) for the Divisions.

* Most of the information used here has been abstracted from a booklet entitled "Greek Public Administration" by E. Zacharioudakis (1980) Head of the Division of the Ministry to the Presidency.

These structures are presented in figure 1 and 2.




FIGURE 1 : The structure of the Ministry in the G.P.A.



FIGURE 2 : Administrative staff in a Greek ministry

There are, however, services which belong to a Ministry, but operate in an independent way either because of the nature of their work or because of their legislative status (Technological Educational Institutes, Universities etc.). In every Ministry there are, also, collective bodies; usually two, namely "Service Council" and "Discipline Council" and they make decisions about personnel affairs.

Employees in the Public Services are classified into "classes" according to the educational degree they hold (N. 1586/1-4-1986). Therefore, there are four classes of employees: ΠΕ (university qualifications), ΤΕ (vocational education qualifications), ΔΕ (secondary education qualifications) and ΣΕ (basic education qualifications, or certificates of work experience).

The hierarchical scale is also divided into four grades. Α, Β, Γ and Δ and the promotion from one grade to a higher one (The highest is Α) is a matter of seniority accompanied according to law, with appraisal of the employee's overall organisational behaviour. The employees of the classes ΠΕ and ΤΕ reach the highest grade Α each according to a different time-scale. However, for employees in the ΣΕ class, the highest grade which they can attain in their career is Γ.

The allocation of personnel in every Ministry or in every service is regulated by particular laws or decrees, which also define the number of the administrative units (General Directorates, Directorates etc.) and the number of personnel required.

As the following section outlines, the actual experience of conducting the research provided important and significant indications of the social and organisational problems which characterize the G.P.A.

2.b. The "bureaucratic" G.P.A. in reality

A recent study of N. Varelidis (1983) introduces the G.P.A. as a Traditional Public Bureaucracy, the operation of which is delimited in the following context:

- Clientelism (use of political influence to further personal and political interests)
- lack of accountability
- citizen mistrust of the state machinery
- Strong state control of the public sector (through extensive formalization, regulation and political managers).

Furthermore, it is the every day citizens' perception which identifies public administration as bureaucracy. In this sense, of course the bureaucratic characterization is far from the scientific perception of the term, as it implies the dysfunctions which affects the lives of the citizens either as servants of the institution or as subjects of its actions.

However, as we saw above, the G.P.A. is a state organisation consisting of a set of offices, staffed with administrative personnel who have been appointed under certain procedures and governed by a leader.

It is characterized by a hierarchical structure of authority and supposedly operates according to universal and impersonally enacted rules. The main written rule is the "Greek Constitution" which delimited the political, social and economic activities within the state.

The leader of the G.P.A. according to the Greek Constitution is the Prime Minister who governs the state along with the Cabinet. The Prime Minister and the Cabinet come from one of the three main political parties, after General Elections which take place every four years, according to the law. The political parties which appear in the political scene of the Greek State are: The right wing party so-called New Democracy (N.Δ.) which adopts a liberal ideology. The socialist party, which is called Panhellenic Socialistic Movement (ΠΑΣΟΚ) and expresses a socialist ideology and the left wing party under the name "Coalition" (ΣΥΝ) which reflects the communistic ideologies.

The percentages of voters which each party represents (according to the last elections in April 1990) are approximately 47% NΔ, 40% ΠΑΣΟΚ, and 10% ΣΥΝ.

The formation and the operation of the political parties is a question of political history. What, however, concerns this study is the role which these parties play in the administrative procedures and the political climate they formulate and within which the G.P.A. is required to operate.

There is no doubt that the G.P.A. appears to be extremely dependent on Politics. There are a number of symptoms which signify

this fact, regardless of the legal frame-work which requires a neutral G.P.A.. The principles of neutrality of the G.P.A. in legal terms is found in the Constitution in the provisions which concern public servants' restrictions as far as the matter of their political convictions is concerned. In this sense public servants are not allowed to participate in general elections as candidates unless they resign from their administrative position. The Constitution, also, requires that public servants be executors of the will of the state (consequently not executors of a particular custodian of the levers of state power elected at any particular time and to serve the public interest.

As Sabino Cassese (in Flogaitis 1987) argues, the impartiality of Public Administration exists in principle in order to protect the clients in their relation to the Public Administration to protect the Public Administration of the Party Political power of the government, to protect the Public Administration in its relations with the interests which are developed within society. (Flogaitis 1987)

However, the impartiality (neutrality) of the G.P.A. seems to be limited only in the above mentioned theoretical application of the Constitution, which, however, does not secure the "informal" involvement of public servants in Political activities. As will be presented in subsequent chapters these informal activities seem to be detrimental to the G.P.A. operation.

One important result of the relationship between the G.P.A. with Politics is the excessive number of public servants who are

accommodated in the various services of the G.P.A. This phenomenon used to be called "*hydrocephalism*" of the G.P.A. This refers to the appointment of too many public servants to fill too few places. As this is analyzed in the next section, historically this phenomenon was the result of the climate of Political clientelism and of patronage. As Etzioni Halery (1979) has remarked "fragmentation makes the system to manage not via universalistic programmes, but via particularistic allegiances, obtained through client dealings." (Clegg, Bow, Bareham 1983, p. 148) Thus before an election, usually, a number of people are appointed in the G.P.A. even under temporary contracts but having the promise from their "*patrons*" to transform the temporary to the permanent, "the assumption being that the voters will then feel a moral obligation (or find it in their interest) to support the donors at the polls - or even to be active on behalf of the donating party" (Etzioni Halery 1979, p. 11). Therefore personnel who are allocated to the various services of the public sector amounted to 452.046 employees in 31.12.1987 (A. Makridimitris 1990). According to the study of A Makridimitris entitled: "*Characteristics of the Greek Administrative Crisis*" the above mentioned personnel are not included in the personnel of the National Health Service, Medical and Nursing staff of IKA, Juridical Bodies, Educational Staff at all levels, Military, Police or Harbour police and fait which gives the real picture of the "*hydrocephalism*" (over numerousness) of the G.P.A., given that the Greek population is approximately 10,000000. In 1890 a traveller wrote: "No where else can you find more public servants than in Greece. It is

reckoned that public servants along with their families are 12% of the Greek population." (Tsoukalas 1985)

Yet, how is it that the G.P.A. recruited too many personnel? Although this question will be analyzed in subsequent chapters it is worth mentioning here that the various laws which concerned the recruitment of personnel in the G.P.A. were full of loopholes such as the fact that recruitment was determined by Political power. Even when the laws secured a kind of equality and meritocracy, selectors, drawing upon Political power, ignored them and found other indirect ways to recruit personnel. Therefore, although there is a law (N. 1735/88) which refers to a selection system, from 1.1.1989 until 28.1.1989 36,000 employees were appointed without the use of that law. (*Public Sector Magazine*)

This excessive amount of personnel seems to be the basis for the formation of a particular social class. "The public servants act more and more like a well organised social power whose main concern is to secure jobs and the unobstructed career development...(Flogaitis 1985, p.51). As Flogaitis remarks party political powers react to this view of public servants and through over legislation try to protect their power and to control the G.P.A.

"Actually, from experience, we know that the law usually constitutes an easy plea, a weapon or a defence but very rarely constitutes a rule of behaviour" states G. Langrond in his report about the G.P.A. He, however, remarks that the Greek mentality is concerned to create laws which are not implemented. In a three year period

(December 1974 - September 1977) 755 laws were enacted. (Pagakis 1988) This massive creation of laws produces major problems for the G.P.A. and constitutes a source of fear for the client who will never become aware of provisions which might interest them. Yet, by contrast, public servants appear to adhere to the laws and therefore avoid initiative and the development of their imagination. (Flogaitic 1987)

Nevertheless, the rules do not seem to serve impartiality as they are not always impersonal. It is very common for rules to be promulgated in order to cover individual cases or to serve particular interests. This is pointed out by Mouzelis (1978): "There are, for instance, numerous examples in Greek parliamentary history of laws tailored to suit particular, political influential capitalists, and of cases where huge state resources are channelled into an area where the political clientele of the relevant Minister are located." (p.265)

Another symptom which emerges in the G.P.A. and highlights the interrelation of Politics with the bureaucratic procedures, is one related to the so-called career officials." What is implied by "career officials" is that the job constitutes a career based on a system of promotion according to seniority or to achievement or both. In the G.P.A., although the job constitutes a career, it depends mainly on the Political convictions of the employees. Therefore the promotion system, which is based on the highly subjective appraisal of employees' performance, contradicts the meritocratic principles which it formally supposes. However, the indifference of public servants towards promotion, gives discretion to the

leadership to promote those whom they prefer. The findings of this research highlight this issue in the next chapter.

The last law (N. 1586) which concerned the promotion of public servants to position of Directors, Head of Division and Managers, never came entirely into effect or was implemented only by a part of the G.P.A. However, until now every government coming into power has moved the employees holding managerial posts. "It is no coincidence, that the first concern of every government is to change the superiors of the G.P.A. reports the magazine *Public Sector*, suggesting the way in which Political intervention affects this bureaucratic procedure.

The way the promotion system is implemented causes a large number of moral problems. The performance appraisal as it is depicted in the official reports exudes a sort of superficiality and irresponsibility. As public servants explain in subsequent chapters, they do not trust this promotion system and sometimes they do not respect their superior because they too are products of such a system. The other problem, which will be discussed in the fourth chapter, is that managerial control suffers from either arbitrariness (as a defence of inherent weakness) or of non-existence. There is a lack of incentive, too, and as G. Pagakis (1988) reports in the magazine *Public Sector*, the last few laws concerning public servants' career development set rather negative incentives.

Therefore, it is not surprising, as subsequent chapters illustrate, that public servants respond to this situation with apathy, absenteeism, poor performance and give the idea that "the working hours tend to be

equal to the time of their physical presence in the public services and nothing more." (Tsoukalas 1987) Furthermore, there are the cases of those who try to escape from this situation by involving themselves in jobs outside the office while performing part of this "outside job" during their working time in the public service. My personal experience has provided me with relevant examples such as of the manager who prepared his lecture for the afternoon course he run in a vocational school, locked in his office and not willing to be disturbed.

The lack of incentives is accompanied by a lack of training and of application of new technological advance. As G. Langron (1964) remarks, in the entire administrative process, lack of appropriate means glides along with the lack of rational and emotional orientation of the public servants towards new administrative methods and substantial discipline.

If one put all these issues together we might be led to the thought that Politics deliberately neglects the procedures which would make life in the G.P.A. meaningful. Where the presence of Politics is not obvious it is, however, creeping in. The picture of the G.P.A. is incomplete without Politics underlying every procedure. The prevailing spirit, which requires a public servant to be merely an executor, does not leave room for independent action and initiative.

The result is that described in the introduction of this study: paralysis of the G.P.A. administrative inertia, irresponsibility servility of

public servants and degradation of their status. It is also the lack of "absolute values" as Weber would say, which leads employees to an emotional withdrawal from their job; while increasing the employees' tendency to identify themselves through informal groups and informal activities which also have Politics as a reference point.

The historical development at the G.P.A. which follows will illuminate some of the reasons why the G.P.A. operates in the way which was described above.

II.3 History of the G.P.A.

The history of the G.P.A. follows the politico-economic evolution of Greek society. It depicts the adventurous historical life of the Greek State and reveals a number of imported western cultural traits.

As various Greek historians and sociologists have remarked, Greek society after four hundred years under the Turkish occupation sought for its historical roots in the Hellenism of the diaspora. Greek ancient history and Greek philosophy had been retained considerably by the Greeks of the West. To the West the independent state turned to find its roots. (Tsoukalas 1986) The Hellenism of the diaspora had developed remarkable economic and intellectual progress, which was placed at the disposal of the newly-established state. This "intellectual" class along with its intelligence conveyed the influence of the culture of Western Europe. All the social and economic changes of the West had affected these people who transplanted thoughts and ideas and strategies to the Greek society which never practised similar changes and therefore did not have a suitable background for such institutions. They established a juridical regime, which was reinforced by the administrative Bavarian school which King Otto and his Regency represented. The laws became powerful weapons in the hands of the authority, as they could control through them the class of public servants which started to increase rapidly. However the primary idea of the juridical regime along with the centralization of the authority was the creation of a "nationalistic

consciousness." (Mouzelis 1978)

The first reason therefore which negatively affected the further development of the G.P.A. was the implementation of foreign prototypes and examples in an inadequate social-economic ground. (G. Langron 1964). Another reason for the peculiar operation of the G.P.A. must be sought in the development of the authority and the economy of Greece.

The Monarchic regime that the Great Powers located in Greece relied for its domination on the contribution of a handful of oligarchic families, the so-called "*tzakia*." (Mouzelis 1978). The *tzakia* in turn obtained their power from their capacity to control the economy and the voters in the newly-established state. The development of the parliamentary institutions increased the power of the "*tzakia*!" as they could bargain the power of the electorate assuring for them positions in the State apparatus which they could control. (Mouzelis 1978) It is in this that one finds the start of the political clientelism which has now rooted deeply into the culture of Greek society, and still plagues it today.

Two informal institutions appear in the clientistic process which maintain their status even now, however, under more sophisticated guises. These are the institutions of "*Koumbaros*" and "*Kommatarchis*." "*Koumbaros*" is the Godfather and because of the Greeks religious belief this relationship is socially very important. Therefore politicians, exploited the power of this religious relationship to obtain political friends. Politicians usually had countless numbers of God children (Mouzelis 1978). Godfather in terms of politics means "*patron*" of the

family. The obligation the family has towards the Godfather is to vote in favour of him and to support him by influencing more people in favour of him. (Vakalopoulos 1983, Pagakis 1988).

The institution of "*Kommatarchis*" on the other hand implies in a clear-cut manner the party political bargain. "*Kommatarchis*" is the "representative" of the politician in the society of the village at the beginning but it is a practice which later was to spread even into the urban centres. The "*Kommatarchis*" emerged when the local landowner of the Turkish occupation era turned into a powerful politician when the state was established. Therefore, he had to move to the capital, where the centralized government was located. However, he needed a mediator in order to control the peasants who looked after his property in the one hand and who affected his political career on the other hand. "*Kommatarchis*" therefore was a mediator. However this role was powerful as having power both over the master (affecting the voter in favour of him) and the agrarians (mediating in favour of them to their master either for a position in the G.P.A. or for any other reason). The fact of the deprivation of the agrarian areas and people's need for dependence on the state budget, increased the power of the "*Kommatarchis*."

This premature dependence of agrarian society on the state generated the political patronage which in turn became a vital need for the peasants in order to survive and promote their interests. (Mouzelis 1978) The Greek economic system transformed into a capitalistic system

without, however, going through a gradual development. This was because Greece had been occupied for 400 years by Turkey and had therefore not experienced a feudalistic form of society. The state budget became the only source of life for the developing society. Thus the dependence of the citizens on the state budget became an end in itself. Administrative "*hydrocephalism*" (accumulation of employees) is therefore a consequence of the economic development of the state. (Tsoukalas 1986)

The administrative staff which first served the G.P.A. came from the class of "*national beneficiaries*" that is to say, the people who had financially supported the revolution of the G.P.A. The state, therefore tried to pay them off by granting them administrative positions. However, as has been mentioned above, these people coming from the powerful social class required the highest administrative positions in order to maintain their power. This movement for the possession of the highest administrative posts was reinforced by the Bavarians who accompanied King Otto in 1833. They required, too, the highest position in order to control the activities of the state. As a result administrative "*hydrocephalism*" was intensified at the highest hierarchical ranks. (Tsoukalas 1986)

This phenomenon remained until today, as the "*national beneficiaries*" and the Bavarians were replaced by "*favoured*" public servants or experts. The bureaucratic structure of the G.P.A. because of the inertia it facilitates, does not seem to have any intention for changes

and thus, this peculiar structure maintains as a static inflexible character. (Tsoukalas 1978)

The role of the first appointed administrative staff was to serve the goals the Monarchy sets. Therefore, they appear in a kind of neutrality in relation to the political parties. However, later, when the parliamentary institutions were developed the public servants were in poor circumstances. Because of the active "*patronage*" and the climate of political clientelism the position of public servants were entirely unstable. Greek political history has a number of pages devoted to the practice which developed in relation to the administrative staff. Every change of the political party in power was followed by a massive dismissal of public servants, in order to be replaced by others politically affiliated to the party in power. (Papachatsis 1983)

"Characteristic of that period was the factional spirit and unscrupulousness of public servants, improper allotment of justice, disdain for the laws widespread corruption. The selection of administrative staff would be determined: a) not by the necessary moral administrative qualifications, but by favouritism, granted by the party in power, b) by the situation in the service; the development of the administrative servant did not depend on proficiency and productivity but on the need for personal loyalty and faith to the party, c) by the dismissal of the administrative servants which was a matter of "group dismissal"; they were replaced by others, without questioning if, among the dismissed, there were people moral, capable and useful to the

service." (Pan-Poulis 1987, p.77-78)

Ch. Trikoupis, (Prime Minister in 1877) tried to overcome this situation through various proposed alterations in the treatment of public servants. Under laws ΧΝΖ'/1877 and ΧΝΣΤ'/1877 the tenure of the public servants became more secure. Also, issues like promotion, selection were affected. Thus, the institution of exams along with formal qualifications is established whereas before and under the law ΝΓ'/3-6-1864 the appointment of public servants relied on Ministers' discretion for the lower rank employees and on the King's discretion for the more senior position. A great deal of effort for public servants' permanence came with law ΑΡΖΓ'/10-5-1884 "concerning the qualification and disciplinary punishment of the public servants". The same law concerns the appointment of staff on a basis of specific qualifications such as university degrees and success in examination. However political conflicts and rivalries caused replacement of the law by the subsequent laws ΑΦΠΔ/1887 and ΑΩΠ'/1890, which generated a smoother operation of the public services.

At the beginnings of the 20th century other laws were enacted concerning the tenure of public servants who had served for fifteen years, and "*Disciplinary Committees*" were established in the various Ministries. This had the effect of reducing the arbitrary power of the Ministers over the public servants. Furthermore, after the Goudi revolution in 1909, a series of laws were enacted in relation to public administration. According to these laws, employees in certain administrative areas were

recruited after taking examinations. Yet, public servants' career development was a concern of committees that were established precisely for this reason. However it was the Revised Constitution of 1911 which put an end to the uncertainty of public servants, stating the public servants would become "constitutionally permanent."

The Constitutional Revision of 1911 was a remarkable stage in the history of the G.P.A. Since then no other constitutions regulation has taken place; as far as the G.P.A. is concerned; while changes in the G.P.A. enforced by general laws, the "Public Servants' Code" prevailed. The first Public Servants' Code was published in 1951 (1811/15-5-1951), based on informations taken by the French service code of 1946, the German service code of 1923, some Italian laws of 1923 and British laws concerning Public Administration. (Another point which supports what has been mentioned above, that is to say, the influence of Western administrative culture on the G.P.A.) This 'Code' constituted the fundamental law for the public servants and the basic line for the evolution of the G.P.A. institutions. However, under new needs, claims, and demands of public servants there were a large number of violations of the "Code" which resulted in reducing the respect and commitment of public servants to the "Code". During the seven years of dictatorship (1967-1974) the "Code" suffered many alterations. It was, however, abolished in 1974 by the post-dictatorship government.

Finally a new Code was enacted in 1977 (NA611/1977) which remains valid today (1990), which however is in doubt inasmuch as it

does not correspond to the recent social, economic and technological conditions.

Substantial alterations were tried in the G.P.A. after 1981 when the "ΠΑΣΟΚ" government was in power. These alterations concerned the career development of public servants (N.1586/1986), the payment scale (N.1505/1984), but also alterations in the leadership of the Ministries with the establishment of positions such as Secretary Generals and Secretary "Specialists" burdened with administrative responsibilities, which, however, constituted political positions rather than administrative ones. Yet, there were changes in the "*Official and Disciplinary Committees*", in order to become more representative for public servants and entertain the idea of public servants' participation.

Nevertheless, the administrative crisis which is confirmed daily along with the desperate efforts for radical alterations which the new government in power made, prove that the legal regulations for the G.P.A. were not fruitful.

Besides the several changes in the administrative laws and the administrative status of public servants throughout the last two centuries, there have been several structural changes in the G.P.A. since it was first established under the decree of 3-15-1833. The G.P.A. as has already been mentioned was characterized by centralization. Since it was established, there were some attempts at decentralization, especially after World War II, when the geographical units into which the State had been divided by the decree of 3-15-1833 obtained a sort of

administrative independence for certain activities. Despite the advantages of decentralization, however, the G.P.A. did not manage to set in full motion this institution throughout the years. Indeed it still remains tightly centralized.

In conclusion, I would note that the history of the G.P.A. provides many warnings to Greek society which could make us to avoid the repetition of past faults. However, these warnings do not seem to be given the significance that they deserve. Consequently they do not become the guide-lines for the further development of the G.P.A. This refusal to learn from history and past mistakes illustrates Crozier's (1964) view that "bureaucracies are the organisations which never learn from their errors."

II.4 Conclusion

The G.P.A., undoubtedly bureaucratic, seems to be based on a contradiction. Although it adopts bureaucratic strategies and structures which imply impersonality and impartiality the G.P.A. operates in a particular partial way in the sense that it seems to be affected significantly by the political party in power. That is to say, the administrative procedures appear to be underpinned by the Political will.

This relation of the G.P.A. with Politics appears to have its roots in the conditions of the establishment of the G.P.A. The adventurous history of the Greek state throughout the years is depicted in the operation of the Greek bureaucracy. The influence of Western administrative culture on the G.P.A. which had a distinctive socio-economic background led to a deformity of the administrative system from the beginning. In addition, in their struggle for the possession of authority the various social classes used the G.P.A. as a means to achieve their aims. The system of Political clientism and patronage was located at that time and since then it became the nightmare of the G.P.A. and at the same time the determinant element of its operation.

All the bureaucratic procedures, as will be presented analytically in the next chapter, are used in such a way as to serve the interests of individuals or particular groups while overlaid under the principles of equality and impartiality that bureaucracy provides. Public servants, however, although they are required to be merely executors, do not avoid

involvement in this game which takes place every day in the G.P.A. Therefore as future chapters will elaborate they respond with apathy and emotional withdrawal from work while trying to prove themselves by involvement in informal activities and by forming groups which have politics as reference points. This tendency will be considered later in relation to the social culture in chapter 5.

In conclusion it can be observed that the G.P.A. although, according to Greek constitution, is supposed legally to be a neutral bureaucratic organisation which exists in order to serve the common interest, in fact is the subject of political power. The term "*rouspheti*" which gives the title to the next chapter describes these practices of Political intervention in certain bureaucratic procedures.

Chapter III: "Rouspheti"

III 1. Introduction

Having examined the prevailing theories of bureaucracy and the specific context of the G.P.A., this chapter focuses upon actual practices of the G.P.A. In particular it demonstrates how bureaucratic principles are often shaped by Political values and priorities. In Greece the pervasiveness of Political influence is described in the term "*Rouspheti*," Thus, "*rouspheti*" describes a series of practices in the G.P.A. which impact on employees throughout their working lives either to their benefit or to their disadvantage.

This chapter therefore deals with this term and highlights the bureaucratic procedures which are affected by it. In this and the following two chapters, quotations are used from my own research into three Greek organisations. My research findings are drawn on selectively to illustrate the key issues surrounding the routine practice of "*rouspheti*" in the G.P.A.

III.2 "*Rouspheti*" - political involvement versus impersonality

As has already been mentioned in the historical development of the G.P.A. (chapter two) "*rouspheti*" is the result of the Political clientelistic relationships which emerged soon after the G.P.A. was created. Scholars, practitioners but also politicians and citizens attribute to "*rouspheti*" most if not all the evils of the disorganisation of the G.P.A. The use of "*rouspheti*" tends to be treated as a "natural" set of practices which are often taken for granted and therefore left unquestioned.

It seems to confirm the popular saying which states "if you have the knife you will eat the melon." In this sense "*rouspheti*" is interpreted in a positive way by those who gain from it. Indeed it becomes a source of pride for those who can use it inasmuch as it provides them with an important means of power. Those who are excluded from those conditions of power, tend to react not by criticising this kind of strategy but by attempting to find similar sources for themselves to depend upon.

"The inexorable logic of "*rouspheti*" always prevails" remarks the magazine *Public Sector* in January 1990 in an article about the G.P.A. That every administrative procedure can be influenced by "*rouspheti*" is highlighted by Laertes, the trade unionist, a member of the central committee of public servants' trade union (ΑΔΕΔΥ). In the following statement Laertes echoes the views of many of any respondents:

"It is *"rouspheti"* which is necessary for somebody to be appointed, *"rouspheti"* to take the desirable post in the office, *"rouspheti"* to be promoted and take a managerial position.

This quotation emphasises how employees' formal life is greatly dependent on their Political connections. It also implies that Politics are embedded in formal procedures. Therefore since *"rouspheti"* is already established, it is never eliminated following the user in all stages of his or her formal life afterwards. The extent to which *"rouspheti"* is used is described by C. Woodhouse (1990), another of the biography of the Greek President K. Karamanlis. He writes in a recent article about the '*Greek psyche*':its use (of *rouspheti*) is so common that it caused me no surprise some years ago to be approached in the street by a distinguished General with a request for a rather delicate *"rouspheti."* Nowadays, because I wrote a biography of Karamanlis, I am often accused of possessing unlimited influence. More than one Greek has rung me up from Athens, with requests that I should approach the President on their behalf."

However, once people have accepted the logic of *"rouspheti"* they are not content with "delicate" ones. They sometimes cry for the moon, backed by their politicians' clientelistic disposal which never denies anything, even if the requirement is illegal. This is highlighted by Hector, a manager who because of his position receives such requests.

"Every day, people come to my office, sent by politicians whose party is in power. They ask for things to be done which run either counter to the law or are impossible. However, clearly expressed is my refusal to satisfy those requests, I'm not believed. The discussion usually ends up with something like: "ok, I'll ask my politician to phone you up and I'm sure, then, you will find a way to do what you now refuse." "I'm fed up," Hector continues, "trying to uphold the power of the law and the regulations".

An example of illegal demand was given by Ulysses, a Director, who describes in a very disappointed manner the rooted mentality of Greeks about "*rouspheti*."

"One day, a lady came to my office whose son had sat for the Panhellenic exams* and the results he got didn't allow him to enter the University or TE.I. The lady, however, wanted him enrolled perhaps not at the University if that was "too much", as she said, but at least, at TE.I. However clearly I explained to her that her requirement was not only obviously illegal but also impossible, as the lists with the students who had passed were publicly available, she insisted that she had been told by her "*patron politician*" that her requirement could be satisfied. How can we plan changes in the G.P.A. and society in general when people think the way the lady does?" he ended up.

However it is rather unlikely that officials who comply with such a request would reveal it. Moreover, there are quite a number of employees who do not share the view that their organisational behaviour must be characterized by impartiality. Thus, besides using "*rouspheti*" for

* The Panhellenic examinations take place once a year and all the candidates for University or TE.I. participate. The institution has a strong reputation for objectivity, fairness and impartiality.

their own development in the G.P.A. they also operate with a personalized and highly subjective set of practices. Artemis, a clerical public servant describes the partiality inherent in public servants' functioning.

"Unfortunately personal feelings interfere in the choice and priority of several of the matters we have to deal with. If something concerns a friend or an acquaintance or a political friend, we try to push the matter forward favourably while for those we don't know or have a conflict with, we delay, or put the matter into a drawer for a long time".

This quotation reveals that "*rouspheti*" works at all hierarchical levels in the G.P.A. while the other side of the same coin reveals resistance, by neglecting cases or "putting them into the drawer" for a long time. Public servants are pushed into such actions mostly by their political convictions, to such an extent that a great many procedures are delayed and plans fail. Agamemnon, an ex-top manager (Secretary "Specialist") explained precisely this point:

"Political allegiance of public servants is so intense as to set up barriers to the pushing forward of a policy and to the establishing of institutions".

There are, however, justifications of "why" "*rouspheti*" and Political intervention exists. It has already been mentioned that specifically for Greece there were historical factors which allowed its development. Moreover the idea of "*rouspheti*" has a more general derivation. It seems to be the response of Politics to the bureaucrats' power of knowledge. This view is stated critically by Clegg (1990). He introduces "*rouspheti*"; although without using precisely this word, as a means of control; a

means which allows Political masters to "divide and rule." According to him, favouritism and such like interventions which advantage a certain group of individuals enable Political mastery to defend their power from the dangerously increased power of knowledge of the bureaucrats. Tsoukalas (1987) also considers the tradition of "*rouspheti*" as a deliberate Political choice so that Political control can be achieved. These findings appear to support Crozier's (1964) analysis of French bureaucracies. According to him, impersonality leads to the weakening of superiors' power over subordinates, inasmuch as everything about subordinates' formal life is precisely defined by impersonal rules and therefore leaves no space for personal interventions. However, as Crozier believes, impersonality also weakens the bargaining power of subordinates.

I would therefore argue that "*rouspheti*" overcomes this kind of weakness caused by impersonality providing supervisor with the power for control on the one hand and bargaining power to subordinates on the other. One must not forget that subordinates' bargaining power relies on the possession of knowledge the administrative secret and the control of files. The bargaining power of employees, in the G.P.A. seems to have developed through the relationship of informal groups with Political forces on one hand, and the formal organisation on the other. This phenomenon, however, will be considered later in the context of organisational culture.

From the foregoing analysis "*rouspheti*" and political intervention seem to be incorporated into the techniques used for the maintenance of Political power and subsequent control over public administration. (Etzioni-Halevy 1979) However, while Clegg (1990) seems to put the beginning of this interrelationship some time after the bureaucratic relationship has been established (when the bureaucrats already serve the system), I would put this at the outset, from the moment a vacant position is advertized. From experience I know that candidates for a position use Political interference in order to speed up selection procedures. Indeed, selection procedures are the first place for "*rouspheti*" and political interference as well.

III.3 Selection

The recruitment of employees is characterized by a great diversity of practices. This is because of the politicization of selection which requires selectors to exercise their discretion within the process. Until 1983 public servants were recruited on the basis of competitive examinations. (Spiliopoulos 1984). In, 1983 under the law 1320 public servants started to be selected according to "social criteria." The law required the processing of candidates' applications by computer in, order to ensure impartiality and objectivity. This law has been used only once since it came into effect. Recently, in 1987, a new law on recruitment in the G.P.A. was enacted but, as yet, it has never been used.

The original selection system was based on the arbitrary disposition of King and Ministers, as revealed by the history of the G.P.A. The implementation of such a system was detrimental to the further operation of the G.P.A. in so far as it created "*rouspheti*" and established an appropriate framework for Political intervention.

The logic of this system is what Jefferson, the American President, converted into a moral principle: "To the victors, the spoils." Recruitment therefore, with spoil system supplied the Political power of the day with obedient and unquestioning personnel, bound by a chain of mutual obligation and therefore ready to serve the interests of its Political masters. (Elzioni-Halevy 1979)

This perception appears to be rooted in Greek public servants, and it is highlighted by Laertes, the trade unionist:

"I believe that the Public Administration has been seen as the booty of the election winner, especially in Greece. The problem of Political interference is an old one but unfortunately is still there".

This quotation implies that although the legislation on recruitment has evolved over the years, the basic tendency of Politics to influence the G.P.A is still dominant. This is also remarked by Dr. Th. Katsanevas, a member of the executive committee of ΠΑΣΟΚ, who underlines the potential of "*rouspheti*" in relation to recruitment.

"Recruitment based on "*rouspheti*" constituted and still constitutes a powerful means of Political control" (*Public Sector*)

Yet, S. Flogaitis (1987), focusing on the same point says:

"The electoral clientelism is the only method for recruitment in the G.P.A." (p.53)

E. Etzioni-Halevy (1979) presents clearly how the mechanism of selection works when public services are characterized by a great politicization: "... the introduction of political appointees into public administration makes it possible for the ruling party to utilize its influence in the administration to hand out a wide array of additional rewards by political criteria. In other words, whenever public servants owe their appointments to political qualifications, they are likely to be under strong pressure (as well as being highly motivated) to aid in perpetuating the power of their patron party. They will usually do so by

allocating whatever rewards they have at their disposal in return for electoral support for the party.The politicization of the public service may thus serve as the basis of a 'spoil system' whose fruit may benefit large numbers of the party's potential supporters at the poll and penalize large number of non-supporters." (p.119)

However, the extent of the politicians' tendency to provide positions for their political friends is particularly illustrated by a saying which is attributed to the former Prime Minister A. Papandreou. He appears to say:

"If I left it up to them (his Ministers) they would appoint the whole of Greece within a week". (article by M. Ploritis in *To Vima* 10-6-1990).

Such a system naturally does not require to be designed or programmed. On the contrary, properly-designed selection system prevent the "free-hunting" of positions by candidates while preventing politicians from expressing their appreciation to their supporters by granting them positions in the G.P.A.

The results of this selection system is that the G.P.A. is staffed by inappropriate personnel often incapable of performing their duties. As long as merit does not underlie recruitment it would seem that employees' capability relies on other criteria such as Political affiliation.

"For us (the Greeks), only the masters of the political party are "capable" and only the strong supporters of the political party are "experienced."

remarks H. Ploritis in his article in the newspaper in (*To Vima* 10-6-

1990). Such personnel due to mutual obligation are very vulnerable to political influence.

This is the beginning of an interdependence where employees become heavily dependent on the Political party in power (which substantially appointed them) while the Political party in power relies on employees (whom it appointed for its successful management). As long as this mutually beneficial relationship works, public administration is likely to be productive and efficient to the extent that the appointed personnel are of good quality, something which seems difficult given the means of selection. Conversely, some personnel may be incapable of achieving any goals even if the relationship of interdependence works. The result would then be inefficiency for the Public Administration.

However, the implemented selection system under law 1320/1983, although objective in the sense that it treated all candidates in the same way, was not meritocratic. The criteria it set such as age, number of children, participation of the candidate or his or her parents in the National Resistance, were not the ones which could assure the recruitment of adequate and capable personnel. Rather, a set of criteria was established to solve the problem of unemployment, using the G.P.A. as the area which could best absorb the work force.

Although this system met with public servants' approval since it was widely perceived as facilitating objectivity, it was later withdrawn. In fact, it suffered from two weaknesses. It provided neither high quality personnel nor supporters of the Party in power. A subsequent system

under law 1735/1987 tried to improve on the previous one by simply adding more criteria concerning the educational level of candidates. However, this law has never been used despite the fact that it effectively prevents Political interference. This has been enough to condemn the system to non-use, especially in a period during which the unstable Political situation makes frequent general elections more likely. For instance, it emerges that last year 100,000 candidates were recruited by the Public Sector in complete violation of the law. This is illustrated by Laertes the trade unionist:

"... during the pre-election period 100,000 people were employed by the Public Administration without the government bothering to use the law it had enacted".

As a consequence, some employees do not have the requisite qualifications, a point highlighted by Orestes, another trade unionist in the central committee of the public servants' trade union. He considers the majority of employees to be the product of "*rouspheti*" and therefore

"they lack whatever the required qualifications are for the service. They don't have any formal or substantial qualifications to cope with the subject of their work and they also lack knowledge in general. They don't have any imagination and they don't have the background to let them move on other kinds of knowledge".

These personnel are not only dependent and easily manipulated but also avoid innovations because of their lack of knowledge, which then leads them to a technique of "self-protection from and resistance to changes of any kind. Thus they often become untrust-worthy officials.

The selection for top managerial positions entails even more Political interference than the selection of other personnel. In fact the

top administrative positions, such as Secretary General, have become absolute Political positions and the appointees although usually well-qualified are selected solely on the basis of their political convictions. The number of "*Political officials*" appointed to the top of the administrative hierarchy increased the years of ΠΑΣΟΚ's power thus, ensuring greater Political control over the G.P.A. (A. Makridimitris 1990)

The only selection system so far devised that seems to be trusted and appreciated by public servants was the one based on a combination of formal qualifications and success in written examinations. This system, according to the views of public servants was the only one which supplied the G.P.A. with highly-qualified personnel while ignoring candidates Political convictions. Pares, a higher-ranked public servant, illustrates this point, he himself being a product of this system.

"We were appointed after we got the exams which were as clear as crystal. We didn't ask for any Political support. To prove that, I'll tell you that all of us appointed at that time (1976) supported the opposite political party from the one in power. If one looks at those people who were employed after having taken the exams, and compares them to the "others", one will realise what a difference there is".

Achilles, a manager with 25 years experience, supports Pares statement: "There is an obvious qualitative difference between the employees who were appointed after they had taken exams and those who were appointed by favouritism without following any procedure".

Many research respondents shared the above view about the selection system by examinations. They seemed to trust it and consider it the system which allows the minimum Political intervention; i.e. "pure" bureaucratic principles working effectively! However, the answer to the

question why this system was no longer valid is a simple one:

"...it didn't allow much Political involvement"

as Patroclus, a university-qualified and high-ranked public servant stated.

Therefore selection procedures produce another paradox. Political power influences the selection of employees and uses it as a means to control the G.P.A. However, this has a detrimental effect on the operation of the G.P.A. as the recruited personnel are unable to correspond with the duties they were appointed for as they were selected on a basis of non-merit. In this sense, the Political power which influenced the selection can not, actually, rely on the personnel it has recruited. It might assure the allegiance of this personnel but not their efficient performance, as selection not based on merit provides personnel of low quality. Nevertheless, despite this paradox, (which has been conceived by the Political powers in Greece), the same strategy continues to be applied. It seems to be more important for Politics to control bureaucracies than to achieve and maximize efficiency.

III.4. Employees' allocation-moving

What all the studies and articles about the G.P.A. highlight is the non-rational allocation of employees to various positions within the Service. It is widely argued that the majority of employees possess their positions because of their connections with the leadership, or because they managed to influence the decision about their placement through Political channels. This can result in some interrelated problems. Employees are appointed, who are not competent, and or are merely favoured by selection. Equally, too few or too many employees are appointed to particular departments.

In seeking to challenge and overcome these selection-allocation problems, the current Minister of the Presidency of the Government, who is responsible for the G.P.A. has begun to try to monitor more closely routine practices in the G.P.A. For example, he has required statistical breakdowns of the staff in all public services. Unfortunately some public servants seems unwilling to cooperate. Others did not have the basic information required.

It would appear that there are offices and services which require fifteen persons to run effectively which are staffed with only five employees, while others which require five, are staffed with, fifteen. This is reported by Kalypso, a high-ranking public servant, who, however, avoids naming the services or the offices she refers to, protecting either the colleagues who work there or herself. Achilles, a

manager, also supports her claim connecting it with favouritism in selection. However, in order to manipulate the placement of personnel every Minister needs the assistance of managers or superiors. Thus, the non-rational allocation of employees involved a "fruitful" interdependence between superiors and Political forces. That, in turn, along with a number of other factors, explains why the first concern of every government is to change the high-ranking administrative staff (Magazine "*Public Sector*" January 1990).

Moreover, the non-rational allocation seems to be affected by employees' tenure. Until 1911, when tenure for public servants was established every governmental change entailed dismissal of all those public servants who were supporters of the previous party in power, to be replaced by supporters of the new one. The myth of Klathmonos square* required replacement of all public servants. (Tsoukalas 1986).

After tenure had been established and the dismissal of personnel was no longer a possibility, the accumulation of employees in several offices started. Inevitably, numbers grew fastest in those departments most easily manipulated by Political forces, and those where employees were least likely to resist political appointees. This trend, continuing to the present day, is for departments to be filled with staff who are inappropriately qualified. This strategy is helped by the criteria set by the law about recruitment. (Any university degree seems

* In this square, it is said all the dismissed employees gathered together and cried when they found themselves unemployed.

to be adequate or sufficient for any position, except where specific technical knowledge is required (N. 1735/1987). Therefore it is not surprising if the superior of a purely administrative department is an economist while the superior of the economic department is a law graduate official. This particular phenomenon is illustrated by Patroclus, a high-ranking public servant and supervisor, who had a degree in economics:

"I hold a post irrelevant to the economic studies I have done, and so, I have never practiced what I was qualified in."

This quotation indicates that employees' allocation is either accidental or enforced by external factors. It also explains to a degree why the quality of service provided by the G.P.A. is too low. It seems to be the consequence of a non-rational use of personnel.

The non-rational allocation of employees is the current concern of the Greek government and also of the public servants' trade union. The latter realized that over-staffing threatens not only the social status of the G.P.A. but also hinders the struggle for improvement of working conditions and the achievement of decent pay. Public opinion of public servants is low, because they are seen to be occupying desks and chairs without, however, presenting a "spectacular" productivity. (Athanasopoulos 1983).

Besides staff recruitment and appointment in the G.P.A., "*rouspheti*" and Political interference are involved in employees' transfers either from position to position in the same service or in another service

or in another city. I could argue that this procedure in particular is very sensitive to Political manipulation, the more so since established tenure removed the weapon of dismissal.

The fear of the employee, mentioned in the introduction of being interviewed, along with the statement she made: "I don't want to move to another city..." show that transfer has become the new "weapon" in the hands of Political masters. Employees' transfers, therefore, operates either as a reward for those committed to and supportive of the Party in power or as a punishment for opposition. This is highlighted by Electra, a clerical public servant who herself was subject to such punishment:

"I, myself, was moved from one workplace to another because of my Political convictions. Besides the moving I had to face not only the hostility of my colleagues but I have, also, been actively prosecuted."

Hector, a manager who has, however, been reinstated after a recent governmental change, had the same experience. He, in addition, put forward another issue related to the transfer of employees because of their Political views:

"What happens when a victim of *"rouspheti"* is reinstated especially in a position which bears authority?"

He wonders if it is a matter of morality to seek revenge on those who contributed to his transfer:

"I'm not going to take revenge now that I'm reinstated and powerful." he states.

His quotation shows the extent of the psychological problems caused by a transfer for Political reasons.

Another high-ranking employee, Jokasta, describes here own experience with transfer. She herself was not threatened with transfer to another office, but her brother, who had been working in the same Ministry was. She believes that this action was due to her Political views and her participation in the activities of the employees' trade union. However, because she is protected in a way, by the fact that she is an active trade unionist but, also, an excellent official, the only way harm could be done to her was through the transfer of her brother. Therefore, she was very depressed and disappointed as having been working productively and loyally for years in the G.P.A., now "she was paid off this way."

The transfer has further consequences. Personnel, especially in managerial positions, revealed a psychological insecurity which prevented them from acting constructively or planning in the long term. This is illustrated by Achilles, a manager.

"Although my position is not a Political one, I don't know if on Monday I will hold the same post. That, to a degree, depends on who the Minister is."

(This interview was held two days before the general election in November 1989). However, not only the managers have psychological problems with transfer. There are also subordinates who even if they do not experience such a procedure themselves, may experience a change of colleagues especially changes of supervisors and managers. Every so often they find themselves in the situation of coping with supervisors who have a hostile attitude because of their transfer to positions they did

not want, or supervisors who are discontented for the same reason.

This is highlighted by Hera, a high-ranking public servant:

"We, the senior public servants, have always been anxious. How are they (she implies the transferred superiors) going to face us? What are they going to be told? Is each one of us to have a "good morning" from the new supervisor? How is she/he going to be treated? The experience of such changes is appalling. We are always under stress and anxiety."

Both procedures analyzed above illustrate their degree of interrelation with Politics. The latter especially displays the tendency of Political power to control the bureaucratic process by attacking its several aspects. The important thing is that when for some reason a bureaucratic procedure does not leave space for Political involvement, Political power shifts to another one. For example, when tenure was established, Political power shifted to the transfer procedure. What is obvious is the tendency of Political power to interfere in every bureaucratic activity.

III.5. Promotion - appraisal system

Firstly, I must distinguish between two promotion procedures. One as referred to as promotion in the hierarchy (ranks A, B, Γ, Δ) while the other is referred to as promotion to certain positions such as manager. For both procedures the decision about promotion is taken by the "Official Council" of the Ministry or the specific service and according to the law it (the Official Council) must be composed of five members of whom three are appointed by the Minister whereas the other two are elected by the personnel. The composition of the Council allows plenty of room for Political intervention and "*rouspheti*".

This fact is reinforced by the way the appraisal system works. Following the bureaucratic idea, the law has specified certain prerequisites for public servants' promotion. Both seniority and good organisational behaviour described on appraisal reports drawn up by superiors, are taken into account. The appraisal report concerns public servants' productivity, willingness to undertake initiatives, acceptance of responsibility, commitment, morality and the like. The system presupposes that the employee is supervised in his or her performance and that the appraisal report formulated by the superior will be based on fairness and objectivity.

The appraisal system seems to allow personal interference and therefore gives power to the superiors concerned. It follows that subordinates ought to be dependent on their superiors, as they will

presumably affect their careers.

However, my findings show that subordinates do not feel any kind of dependence on their superiors for this reason. They do not pay any particular attention to the "appraisal reports" as they do not consider them as influencing their career development. This belief in turn causes a slowdown in their performance, as they take for granted that they will be promoted regardless of their performance. Hecuba, a clerical public servant, highlights this belief:

"Anyway I'll climb up the ranks regardless of whether I'm hard-working or not. How my official report sounds is neither here nor there to me. I would appreciate it though if my performance was appraised rationally."

Nevertheless, although an unfair appraisal does not affect employees' career development, it does affect employees' psychological situations, pushing them further towards uncommitted behaviour or psychological withdrawal from their work, in two ways. For those who work productively, an appraisal report identical with that of a colleague who does the bare minimum generates intense feelings of disappointment because of such unfairness. (F. Hefron 1989). To those, on the other hand, who are unconcerned such an appraisal report generates a feeling of complacency and increases their tendency to indifference. (F. Hefron 1989). This point is illustrated by Polyxena, a clerical public servant:

"Whatever their performance, all employees have almost identical appraisal reports and they are given promotions. It annoys me, as in the past I used to collaborate with people who did nothing. The promotion system is not fair."

All the employees are appraised the same way while some of them are not performing at all...but they get promotion exactly the same as the employees who work very hard and struggle with their work."

Highly subjective appraisal reports tend to be unworthy and valueless.

There are a great number of employees such as Pares, a high-ranking official, who believes that the appraisal reports express their superior's philanthropic wishes rather than their judgement of the subordinates' organisational behaviour. Pares sees the appraisal procedure as operating like this:

"..can I give Alexis A and Manolis B? No,...it's impossible, although the difference between them is clear. So, I'll give A to everybody, and then everybody has A and everybody seems to be excellent and so who is going to be the superior?"

This quotation touches the point on which Political intervention relies.

The plethora of excellent identical appraisal reports is ripe ground for the growth of favouritism and "*rouspheti*". Discretion is left to the Political masters to fill crucial posts with its own people. This way of promotion to managerial posts leads to numerous reactions either by candidates for these positions or by subordinates.

Firstly, antagonism develops between the prospective candidates.

Secondly, the candidates who were excluded from holding a position while estimating themselves as capable of doing so start to question their superior's official status and consequently their superior's judgement and power. The feelings which are generated by such a situation are described by Pares, who does not hide his bitterness at

having experienced antagonism for years and having been unfairly appraised.

"...who is going to judge whether you do or do not deserve to be promoted, or to estimate your performance?"

Nevertheless, managers' views about the appraisal system do not seem to be much different from those analyzed. However, they do seek to justify the development of the strategy which they follow.

They ascribe their flexibility to the difficulty of measuring performance because of the lack of good clarity. This point is supported by F Heffron (1989): "The problem with measuring public sector productivity begins with attempting to specify the output of public organisations. The lack of good clarity characteristic of public organisations makes even identification of outputs difficult."

Another point the manager makes is that the appraisal process is neglected by superiors (Minister, Secretary General). That, therefore, establishes a kind of strategy which starts from the top of the hierarchy.

It is Achilles, a manager, who states:

"An appraisal report hasn't been drawn up for me for the last seven or eight years. I don't care what happens as long as it doesn't affect my career development. The appraisal reports which are made are nothing but a parody and this is ridiculous for the institution. How can you judge your subordinates' productivity when you have not been judged by somebody else?"

Achilles' quotation provides a justification which converts a clear-cut bureaucratic process, as is appraisal, to a moral problem for managers. On the same basis, however, Menelaus, a personnel manager, recognises the highly subjective nature of appraisal, when he

states:

"My judgement is not objective as my supervisor's judgement is not objective. We are accustomed to appraising all employees' work performances more generously than, in fact, they deserve. Thus, the good employee is usually estimated as perfect, the bad one as moderate and as for the moderate he is judged as good. As far as the drawing up of appraisal reports is concerned, it is a matter of routine and nothing more... In this way I, myself, contribute negatively to the G.P.A. operation."

This quotation implies that the appraisal system is often perceived to be unfair towards the productive workers and is therefore simply an emotional issue within the organisation. Yet, equally, it highlights the low value of appraisal reports and the poor contribution of the appraisal system to the administrative process and to the motivation of employees.


Yet, both quotations reveal that the managers do not consider the appraisal system as a means of power and control although it is a basic factor in employees' career development. Therefore, the bureaucratic procedure which is a source of power for managers and supervisors, especially because it allows personal interference in employees' career development, in practice appears not to give them any particular power.

On the other hand, if one returns to the subordinates' quotation, it is clear that employees do not seem to feel any sort of dependence on their superiors because of the authority they have to appraise their performance.

I would attribute this phenomenon to Political interference which runs counter to Crozier's finding, according to which it is impersonality that weakens superiors' power and subordinates' bargaining power.

Political intervention in employee promotion to high-ranking hierarchical positions established an "unwritten" rule which leads to the idea that promotion does not rely on appraisal but on Political connections. That in turn reduces the value of the appraisal system which becomes simply "a matter of routine", while the superiors responsible for appraising employee performance react more like Samaritans than like powerful officials.

And that is the end and the beginning at the same time of a vicious circle, as the identical appraisal reports increase the Political intervention while reducing further the value of appraisal and the superiors' control through it.



III.6. Conclusion

This chapter has suggested that the bureaucratic procedures of the G.P.A. such as selection or promotion are often characterized by Political intervention.

As a consequence, equal treatment among employees but also clients is not established. Furthermore, selection based on non-meritocratic criteria provides the G.P.A. with inappropriate personnel and thus generates suitable conditions for the development of inefficiency. The tendency to inefficiency is reinforced by the non-rational and favouritistic allocation of employees transfers or changes to opponents of the Political party in power and finally promotion and filling of crucial administrative positions based on "*rouspheti*" and nepotism.

"*Rouspheti*" therefore and the Political involvement it implies, seem to destroy the myth of neutrality of the G.P.A. They also indicate that bureaucracies must be restructured as far as their organisational performance is concerned, as they neither secure the promise of equality of treatment nor efficiency.

CHAPTER IV : Managerial Control and Labour Resistance - The Greek version.

IV.1. Introduction

The previous chapter explored the influence of "*rouspheti*" on selection. This chapter presents a broader analysis of the way that Politics also dominates the basic organisational function which is "control". Already the background is made by selecting for managerial positions preferred officials. The next stage, then, for Politics is to inspire or to enforce the form of control exercised over employees.

This chapter, approaches the issue of control by examining the extent to which bureaucratic organisation is in fear of managerial control. After a general discussion of control in organisations, the chapter enquires in detail into the G.P.A. drawing upon the research findings and considers to what extent management seeks and is able to control the organisation. It, also, examines the forms of control applied and the resistance or the resentment which arises amongst employees.

Recent writings on the labour process (Thompson 1983, Edwards 1979) have illustrated the interrelation between control and resistance in organisations. Accordingly, the final section of this chapter considers trade unionism in the G.P.A. as an important response to quite rigid managerial control.

The theme of this chapter reinforces the overall perspective of the

thesis which highlights the way that Political involvement taints or corrupts organisational practices within the G.P.A. Managerial control, therefore, is examined in this chapter in order to demonstrate how bureaucracy can be manipulated in practice and how large is the gap between typical models of bureaucracy and particular organisation practices.

IV.2. The nature of management control.

The concept of control may be interpreted in a number of different ways with varying connotations. Rathe (1960) has listed some 57 varieties ranking from "prohibit" to "manipulate".

Within organisation studies control has become a controversial issue. It is connected with a number of positive functions such as predictability, order, reliability and stability. It is, however, connected with domination, coercion, exploitation and manipulation, as well. Absence of control in the first case entails anarchy, chaos, disorder and uncertainty while in the second case it leads to freedom, individuality, discretion, responsibility and autonomy. (D. Buchanan and A. Huczynski 1985).

Nevertheless, control is an important managerial feature (Mullin 1985, 1989). Indeed, under the *torchlight* of critical perspectives it is the core of conceptualizations of management (Reed 1989). Different approaches to management or to organisational theories have interpreted control in different ways.

According to Mullin (1985, 1989) there are four different approaches to control.

1. The classical approach, which focuses on organisations as structures with formal procedures, that is to say it puts emphasis on the technical requirements of the organisation, and it considers control as the

necessary element for efficiency. Underlined by the universalistic aspirations of classical management theory, the technical perspective analyzing management focuses, also, on the structure as the formal mechanism "for co-ordinating and controlling task performance on a rational and continuous basis." (Reed 1989, p.3).

2. The human relation approach which puts emphasis on the social organisation, the social needs of the members of the organisation, sees control as self-defeating, as it can cause employee resistance.

3. The open systems model sees control as the "inter-relationship among inputs, outputs and the series of activities which lead to the outputs." (Mullin 1985, 1989 p. 460) while

4. In the contingency approach which advocates that "there is no one, best structure" control is a matter of contingency of the situation. In numerous organisational studies control has been considered, usually from different perspectives. Thus, control has been examined in relation to power and influence. Tannenbaum for instance, defines control as "any process by which a person or group determines (i.e. "intentionally affects") the behaviour of another person or group, in other words, causes someone else to do what they want them to do." (Tannenbaum 1962 in D. Pugh, S. Hickson, G. Hinings 1983 p.79) While D. Cherrington (1989) confronts control as the "epitome of influence" (p.727).

Control has been referred to in organisational theories with regard to authority. (Blau and Scott 1962) According to Blau "authority is deemed necessary for co-ordinating and controlling large organisations."

(Blau 1964, p.222). Efficiency is also interrelated with control (Arrow 1964). Furthermore, it is often a concept of a control viewed in conjunction with employees' emotional well-being and satisfaction along with the performance of the organisation (T.K. Das 1989). The "regularity of behaviour in organisation" is defined in control terms by Pennings and Woiceshyn (1987) while for E. Lawler (1976) control is the reason for the creation of three major human problems for organisation : rigid bureaucratic behaviour, inaccurate information and resistance.

Regardless of the approach or perspective, all systems of control, which may be as diverse as "the creation of a moral machinery, through the development of piece-work to the introduction of scientific management and human relations, although they all have implications for the structure of organisation, were oriented to individuals and groups within organisations ..." (S. Clegg and D. Dunkerley 1980, p.483) The authors of this quote were clearly influenced by the labour process approach. Labour process studies illuminate significantly the above point through the evolution of control. In this literature it has been conceptualized that several systems of control were initially developed as means of the capitalist labour process (Clegg and Dunkerley 1980). Subsequently, during its historical development control has undergone various changes in relation to factors such as the size of the firms.

In the nineteenth century, the prevailing system of control was the "simple" one of "direct control" and was exercised over employees by the bosses of small business. This system was not based on a particular

structure and thus, it was characterized by the arbitrary discretion of the employer. (R. Edwards 1979). Simple direct control was consequently developed into entrepreneurial control, which was also informal and unstructured. A later development was the development of hierarchical control marked by the growth of the firm. (R. Edwards 1979).

Even the hierarchical control which was based on the boss' (foreman, supervisor, manager) rights to hire and fire employees, to direct their work, to evaluate and promote or demote, to discipline them, to arrange rewards; in other words to act as the entrepreneurs have done "in the arbitrary, idiosyncratic and unencumbered way" did not solve the increased need for control a firm grew. (R. Edwards 1979).

With the development of scientific management the idea of technical control appeared. Scientific management promised a resolution to the control problem which gave rise to efficiency and greater control. "*Taylorism*" in management seemed to apply "scientific methods" and was characterized by extreme rigidity. Control was exercised through three elements : the direction of the work task, the evaluation of the work done and the reward and punishment system. (P. Edwards 1979). *Taylorism* was not limited to production workers, as all the previous systems had been, but in early 1917 it was also applied to the clerical workforce (Thompson 1983).

"*Taylorism*" appears "to dominate the world of production" and the work was organised under Taylor's principles (Braveman 1974). However, R. Edwards (1979) argues that *Taylorism* was not a widely-

tried system. "The extent and incidence of scientific management has always been something of a mystery....." he states. (p.101).

Moreover, regardless of the extent to which scientific control was implemented, it failed to resolve the crisis and capitalists sought for new forms of control.

By the end of the nineteenth century, firms had grown dramatically and the staff on the other hand had started to resist what appeared as increasingly arbitrary rules. Yet, the labour movement was maturing and a more structural form of control emerged.

Another kind of technical control "emerged from employers' experience in attempting to control the production operation of the firm." (P. Edwards 1979, p. 20). Technical control utilized punishment to obtain compliance and it, as *Taylorism* had also done, gave rise to waves of employee resistance. Therefore, it was replaced by another structural form of control which, however, was more sophisticated and impersonal (R. Edwards 1979).

Bureaucratic control appears in the post-1945 period attempting to eliminate the prior forms of control. Its superiority was based on "systematic administrative structures." As Thompson (1983) states "it routinizes the functions and procedures of management, stratifies work and job titles and governs appointments and promotion by impersonal rules."

Unlike scientific control, bureaucratic control was developed in

offices for controlling white-collar staff, but its success "impelled firms to apply the system more broadly." (R. Edwards p.21). As R. Edwards remarks, bureaucratic control constitutes the "managerial revolution" of the modern corporations, as it can apply to the office as well as to the production lines. The basis of this control is the impersonal force of rules or organisational policy. "In the most fundamental aspect" remarks R. Edwards "bureaucratic control institutionalized the exercise of hierarchical power within the firm. The definition and direction of work tasks, the evaluation of workers' performances and the distribution of rewards and imposition of punishments all came to depend upon established rules and procedures, elaborately and systematically laid out." (p.131).

This impersonality involves an impersonal control technique which leads supervisors to detach themselves from their own feelings, attributing to the rules the responsibility for their own organisational behaviour. Rules also benefit managers in another way; they dictate unchangeable repetition of several organisational actions without repetition of instructions by the managers (A. Gouldner 1954). Furthermore, the rules alter the role and the power of supervision as the supervisors are also subject to supposedly objective rules and procedures. (Thompson 1983).

As R. Edwards suggests there are three basic elements through which control operates:

1. Defining work tasks and directing workers.

2. Supervising and evaluating workers' performance.
3. Eliciting co-operation and enforcing compliance.

However, "what distinguishes bureaucratic control from other control systems is that it contains incentives aimed at evoking behaviour necessary to make bureaucratic control succeed." (p.148). Therefore, whereas scientific and technical control emphasis punishment bureaucratic control puts emphasis on rewards, while it designs the picture of the "good worker".

In this sense bureaucratic control appears more totalitarian than other control systems as it does not merely require obedience and compliance to certain procedures but it requires the entire employees' behaviour to be consistent with its principle.

Nevertheless, bureaucratic control seems to generate less employee resistance, compared with other control systems. That is because, the control exercised is rather "opaque", insidious, and "affects human behaviour and attitudes in ways that do not involve the experience of being controlled or manipulated." (D. Buchanan and A. Huczynski 1985 p. 474)

As P. Blau and R. Shoenherr (1971) argue, bureaucratic control is legitimized by the fact that it appears to be neutral.

Regardless of the degree of resistance that management control systems engender, in order to be successful, they must try to use mechanisms which influence human behaviour and overcome resistance.

(Mullin 1985, 1989) One such mechanism is proposed by Tannenbaum as "participation", which can act as a means of control. According to him, participation on the one hand reduces dissatisfaction and increases the identification of members with the organisation, while on the other hand "paradoxically, through participation, management increases its control by giving up sources of its authority." (Tonnenbaum in D. Pugh, D. Hickson and G. Hinings 1983, 1984 p.78).

Mullin (1985, 1989) also lists some mechanisms for overcoming resistance :

- consultation and participation
- motivation
- groups and the informal organisation
- organisational structure
- leadership style and system of management.

Hence control protects itself through the above-mentioned mechanisms which have in the effect of making it appear both more opaque and sophisticated. Control cannot be avoided as it is indispensable for organisations. (Tonnenbaum 1968, p.3).

The nature of control permits interpretation either positively or negatively. Its historical development introduces control as a means in the hands of capitalists, even where its precise genealogy pre-dates these uses (Clegg 1989), while it can also go beyond capitalistic societies and productive organisations. (S. Clegg and D. Dunkerley 1980).

Bureaucratic control appears to be the most sophisticated version

of the major historically evolved control system and it is the most applicable to modern organisations. It is especially suitable for public administrations. (Mullin 1985, 1989). The contemporary mechanisms through which it is exercised are closely related to means deployed for overcoming resistance. The next section build on the preceding to examine, first, the role of manager and, second, the response of employees in the context of bureaucratic control within the G.P.A.

IV. 3 Management Control and the G.P.A.

3.a. Managers in the G.P.A.

As the literature about managerial control suggests (R. Edwards 1979, Reed 1989 etc.) the structure of the organisation dictates the form of managerial control exercised. Therefore, in the G.P.A., managerial control operates through bureaucratic means which presuppose that control relies on rules and is exercised through a hierarchy, which, in terms of structure, corresponds more or less to the Weberian ideal type. Yet control, as various theories reveal, can be used to ensure employees' compliance (through various ways ranging from coercion to contest) in order to set goals for the organisation to achieve.

However, most of the theories seem to neglect the possibility that managerial control can be used as a means for Politics to enforce partial policies. The G.P.A. appears to be an example where managerial control serves Political interest to a great extent in a way which is routinely legitimized and taken for granted. That happens, first, by the replacement of the "career administrative officials" in senior managerial positions by "political" ones and, second, by promoting personnel in the various managerial posts without meritocratic procedures.

The first question, seems to be the signal which indicates the presence of politics in the administrative process and pre-defines the quality of the managerial control exercised. According to Weberian

theory, elected politicians must be placed in the senior positions in the hierarchy in order for bureaucracy to operate successfully, and also for bureaucrats' power to be kept in balance. In the G.P.A. the top of the hierarchy in each administrative unit (Ministry) is the Minister. Under this person, according to the theory, administrative staff should build up the administrative pyramid. Moreover, in the G.P.A. there are two other positions at the top of the hierarchy (under the Minister) which are filled by "political officials", who, however, are burdened with clear-cut administrative accountability. These are the positions of the Secretary Generals and Secretary "Specialists" which replaced previously established administrative positions such as the General Director.

Under the legislation N.1232/1982 and N. 1588/1985, the above mentioned "political officials" were appointed for a certain period, (i.e. the period that the political party which appointed them was in power) according to the Minister and without particular criteria other than their Political allegiance to the Government of the day. (Makridimitris 1990).

Besides manifesting the party politicization of the G.P.A. this routine practice creates various operational problems. However, the "political officials" do not usually come from the administrative area and are often not aware of the administrative process. In addition they often do not have the necessary managerial qualification of training. (Athanasopoulos 1983). Therefore in their control function they are instructed from "above", or follow strictly the "law". Furthermore, their lack of administrative experience creates problematic situations vis-a-vis

an experienced "subordinate" who questions every order given. (Flogaitis 1987). Finally, the fact that "political officials" are usually younger than the managers in the various managerial posts, or the senior public servants, overthrows the scale of age in the organisation and along with other factors such as the violation of the pay-scale, generates anti-productive attitudes. (Flogaitis 1987). There are also a number of other problems, such as those related to continuous changes of the "Political officials" and resistance from employees.

The second question concerning the promotion of employees to the various managerial posts has already been analyzed in the preceding chapter, as it is also a question of "*rouspheti*" and political interference.

From the foregoing analysis it may be recalled that the managers in the G.P.A. who are called to exercise control are burdened with "political obligations" and therefore "sensitive" to the way they are going to exercise control.

Agamemnon, an ex-Secretary "Specialist" illustrates in an implicit way the point made above :

"I could say that in this country, at this very moment, there are no suitable officials to deal with control."

What he implies is the lack of qualified managers who rely on "what" they know and not on "who" they know.

The lack of managerial training is also highlighted by another manager, Achilles:

"There are not qualified managers in the G.P.A. nowadays."

He implies that although managers are university qualified, they have not done "management studies" specifically. Hence managers are criticised in the G.P.A. for lacking qualifications, for being incompetent and for their political manipulation.

On the basis of these findings, it might be concluded that there really is no hope for any change in the G.P.A. This is particularly so when even within the trade union there are attitudes such as : "the managers in the G.P.A. must be characterized by political allegiance to the party in power, inasmuch as it is the only way for the political decision of the government of the day to be implemented." (This was revealed by Priamus a trade unionist as a statement which had been expressed in a congress of ΑΔΕΔΥ, the public servants' trade union.

Nevertheless, control, as interwoven in the management function, is exercised, poorly or not, successfully or not, regardless of managers' specific qualifications or "political" derivation.

3.b. The means of managerial control in the G.P.A. and its implications for employee identity.

According to several theories about managerial control mentioned in the previous section, control is exercised through different strategies such as organisation structure, recruitment and training, rewards and punishment, policies and rules, budget machinery (Don Hellriegel and I Slocum, 1978) or through expert power, selective recruitment and allocation of resources (Blau and Shoenherr 1971). Specifically, however, bureaucratic control, as it has been referred to, is exercised by defining work tasks and directing workers, supervising and evaluating workers' performance, eliciting cooperation and enforcing compliance.

In the G.P.A. laws and rules, either general or specific, for certain workplaces outline the tasks of employees without, however, going into details. The Minister has the responsibility for delegating power down through the hierarchy (Makridimitris 1990) and to define the tasks of public servants. Therefore managers' accountability depends on the job security of Ministers. Hence, this generates a climate of uncertainty, given that every four years (the longest period between elections) accountabilities are modified. Furthermore, during the pre-election period managers are substantially without any responsibility as the Ministers who had assigned competencies to them resign before elections. Consequently there are periods when managerial control does not exist when the G.P.A. appears to be a system in paralysis.

This is consistent with my observations when this research was developed. Managers in the departments seemed to be more preoccupied with political campaigns than with managerial control while the staff, regardless of ranking position, joined political events taking place in their workplace, such as talks by politicians, during working hours. The entire upheaval, however, can be justified as necessary if it is taken into account that managerial position and the "prevailing spirit" at the organisation depends greatly on the election results and the new Minister.

This is also explained by E. Etzioni - Halevy (1979) who referring to the Australian case points out: "material benefit accrues only if the candidate or the party comes to power (or it is maintained in power) which makes his or its election a matter of self-interest to the beneficiaries." (p. 75-75).

Therefore, even if not all employees are considered as beneficiaries, they all seem to be amenable to the consequences of the link between administration and Politics. "The existing irrationality turns out to be functional, because it is easily amenable to dealing with clientele. The bureaucratic machine itself becomes a party to such dealings, since the general inefficiency allows the senior ranks to transform into negotiable items what should be institutional duties." (Ferraresi cited in Clegg, Dow and Borehan, 1983).

The above points are illustrated by Patroclus' statement who is a supervisor and has been working for 25 years in the G.P.A.:

"The managers in the central services but also in the regional ones are dependent on their political master, the Minister. Their responsibilities are not derived from the position he or she holds but they are delegated by the Minister. Therefore the dependence on the political master is direct and...you see, when it is pre-election period the G.P.A. gives up working, it is entirely paralyzed until the time the new Minister will come to set the rules for new start."

From Patroclus' statement one can infer that managerial control is unlikely to be consistent and stable and appears to be quite changeable and geared to current conditions. Directing workers, which is the other strategy of bureaucratic control, seems to be rather neglected in the G.P.A. According to R. Edwards (1979), directing workers implies carefully articulated job descriptions but also training for the new employees, which as E. Langer (1970, in R. Edwards 1979) remarks "it is used for articulation and rehearsal of the unwritten procedures and for teaching the implicit expectations of the job. (p. 137).

As we discussed above, explicitly defined job descriptions do not exist in the G.P.A. As far as training sources are concerned, at the outset of employees' career, they are non-existent. For individuals to learn what is expected of them doing their job in the G.P.A. they must rely on the willingness of their colleagues, to train and educate them, rather than on the support of managers.

All the respondents made comments about this point. The majority of public servants in the G.P.A. saw themselves as "fish in troubled waters" at the beginning of their career, asking for help anywhere. Telemachus, a high-ranking public servant who has been

working for fifteen years in the G.P.A., remembers:

"when I first joined the G.P.A., I found myself in an office with a supervisor who wanted to teach me nothing. She expected me to be entirely dependent on her and to do only subordinated and mundane jobs. She didn't instruct me to draw up a document, although I asked her and I was suffering..."

Hecuba, however, a clerical public servant has a different experience:

"I was taught my job by an ambitious supervisor we had. She used to give us initiatives and burden us with responsibilities, while she held us a lot to achieve what we were doing. But she loaded us with stress, as she wanted everything to get done straight away, without any delay."

Many employees attribute learning about their jobs to their colleagues.

An equally common view of many respondents was that a training course at the beginning of their careers would have facilitated their self-confidence and it would have made them less dependent on colleagues or supervisors. In addition, learning the job from colleagues tends to reproduce the status quo in the G.P.A., since along with the instructions for the job the "establishment" mentality of the older public servants is transmitted to the new appointees. That is to say, new recruits are socialized into the informal workplace culture.

The supervision and evaluation of workers' performance was discussed in the previous chapter. As the appraisal system in the G.P.A. is not in practice part of the control strategy, it hardly contributes to promotion and to career development for the reasons which have been analyzed. Furthermore, the appraisal system hardly contributes to

"eliciting cooperation and enforcing compliance" since it fails to reward or punish employees. Rewards and punishment are rather meaningless terms in the G.P.A. There are no "exceptional" promotions due to excellent work performance. Furthermore, the legislation does not provide for any kind of financial reward to those graded "excellent." Although punishment is included in the legislation, it is rarely applied. The history of the G.P.A. since tenure has been established, has not been characterized by many dismissals as a means of punishment. Employees, also, have no such experience themselves or with colleagues.

Menelaus, the manager, highlights this point:

"during my public life (he has been working for sixteen years in the G.P.A.) I haven't heard that a public servant has been dismissed, apart from a few exceptional cases where corruption had been involved."

Menelaus' view is supported by almost all respondents in this project.

Besides rewards and punishment, managerial control in the G.P.A. seems to neglect other elements such as incentives, which, also, lead to "enforcing compliance and eliciting cooperation." Nevertheless, talking about incentives, the question arises: what do employees really want in the G.P.A. in order to cooperate effectively?

The answer comes from employees' responses, which are summed up as follows:

1. Public servants want meritocracy in the procedures which affect their career, from selection to recognition, and therefore ask for the depoliticization of the G.P.A.
2. They want recognition as employees and as personalities.

3. They want participation in decision making.
4. They want career-life training.
5. They are also naturally interested in better pay and improvement in their work conditions.

What this classification implies is that managerial control has to deal with and satisfy public servants' "abstract needs" which seem to be related to employees' identity within the workplace. The crisis of effectiveness and efficiency in the G.P.A. appears to be accompanied by public servants' crisis of identity. That is to say, that managerial control reinforces problems of identity for employees.

"what am I now? wonders Pares, a university qualified high-ranking public servant, and he continues:
"Nothing. My personality is ignored along with my experience and my knowledge."

He had asked this question after he had enumerated a number of procedures which reveal that his personality is actually ignored; he does not participate in decision-making, he is not allowed to take initiatives, he is not appraised fairly on a meritocratic basis. Pares' question-statement manifests clearly the crisis while indicating some weak points of managerial control.

Participation in decision-making and undertaking of initiatives are some of the areas which reflect and reinforce employees' creativity and growth in maturity (Morgan 1984). This is especially so for Greeks who are pushed by historical and cultural traditions (democratic tradition) of

participation in decision-making and it appears to be essential for their public life. The majority of the respondents in this project refer to participation in decision-making as a factor of great importance. They seek to share in managerial control. Also, they ask for initiatives while being willing to take any responsibility that initiative entails.

A few quotations will illustrate these points:

"I wish I had more ability to take initiatives and participate in the decision-making. I could have solved a lot of my problems." remarks Penelope, the supervisor of the department of administrative affairs.

"I wanted to be able to take more initiatives. That could make my job easier and I could perform twice as fast as I do now." says Ajax, an employee of the computing department.

"For me, participation in decision-making means recognition of my value as an employee, which, also, means that I am trusted and that I am capable of taking responsibility." states Iphigenia, a clerical public servant.

Meritocracy in every bureaucratic procedure is the other issue that employees highlight.

"Meritocracy in every aspect of our public life is an incentive for me and pushes me to perform more efficiently."

remarks Jokasta, a university qualified public servant in the International Relations department. Her view is supported by Patroclus a supervisor.

"If I know that my performance at work as an official, and not my political allegiance would be appraised, and that would be the only criterion, I would work more productively."

These comments illuminate the problem highlighted in previous

chapters, of the absence of meritocracy in bureaucratic procedures. Both employees wish to define themselves as "employees with values and merits" and to reject the evaluation of themselves as "employees who have the position because of favour."

This need of employees to be identified as valuable and to hold a position on merit, is interrelated with their need for recognition. Employees were very concerned to have their identities confirmed in the workplace.

They want their organisational behaviour and performance to be acknowledged and seek to be recognised as "good employees" not only from their superiors but also from their peers. Artemis, a clerical public servant articulates the point:

"Recognition from my supervisor but also from my peers gives me satisfaction and it is an encouragement to perform better."

Besides Artemis, the majority of the respondents defined recognition as the number one incentive.

Public servants also want training in order to gain knowledge and improve their performance, while strengthening in this way their official status. Hecuba, a clerical public servant, highlights this point:

"training drives you to another way of thinking and helps you to feel more confident as an employee and more comfortable with your job."

What Hecuba implies is that employees feel more confident and powerful when they know how to perform better. They want to adjust their

public life to the modern world and they want to know how to use technological advances. Training helps them to keep pace with the development of technology. It seems to be challenging for employees that there be the implementation of new organisational methods or the use of technological advances. Training keeps their minds open to changes and to new ideas. It also appears to be another means for identity inasmuch as it satisfies this need through expertise and knowledge which are additional sources of power, according to bureaucratic theory.

Money, for public servants in the G.P.A. is also implicated in the struggle for identity. Money itself is not an important monitor, as the majority of the respondents argued, but it is important as a means to establish employees' identity and status. For example, Achilles, a manager, remembers his supervisor's advice when he first went to work: "You must always have money with you when you go to the cafe and don't allow people to know that you can't afford to buy a drink for them because of your poor salary as a public servant."

The paradox which, however, arises in the G.P.A. is that while the employees appear to consider money as a second tier of value, outsiders hold the view that public servants are only interested in how to increase their salaries. This is reflected in the way the press and public opinion criticize the strikes of public servants. I would argue that Political mastery usually highlights money and isolates it from the other goals that employees struggle for. What is achieved by that is that, on the one

hand, wage demands are easier to be attained than other employee demands such as job satisfaction. (It must be taken into account that public servants' wage demands are usually reasonable and within the limits of the budget of the state.) Furthermore, Political mastery secures the support of public opinion in the case of excessive "wage -demands by public servants, especially when for the majority of the citizens public servants are considered as the "drones" of the state. On the other hand, Political mastery overcomes the difficulty of coping with the "abstract" issues, which seems to be really important for the employees' public life which, however, might entail some political cost. In this sense the weight is shifted from important but "abstract" issues, to practical and tangible ones. Therefore money besides being a means of employee identity, is a means of control.

Working conditions are also used as a means of identity. Employees desire comfortable offices, well-furnished with heating or air condition. They try even at their own expense to make their offices "more civilized" not only for their own sake but for their clients, as the condition of the office appears to be a source of prestige for employees.

Alcestis, a clerical public servant illustrates the above point:

"I tried to humanize this place bringing plants from my house, collecting chairs here and there from several offices...I'm ashamed when clients come to my office, because of the poor appearance of it..."

Unfortunately, in their control practices managers ignore how important it is to achieve coordination and active cooperation by satisfying employee needs. They appear to be stuck to the "traditional" spirit which requires

subordination to the Politics of the workplace, hidden, however, behind the impersonality of the laws. The previous chapter has already analyzed how appraisal and meritocracy are treated by managers while this section revealed how critically they affect employee identity in the workplace. This crisis of employee identity along with a high degree of dissatisfaction are the results of the way managerial control is exercised. Hence, employees respond to this situation with a wave of resistance.

3c. Public servants' resistance.

The expressions of resistance in the G.P.A. appear to be apathy, absenteeism, psychological withdrawal from the job and turnover. All these symptoms are expected as various theories observe (E. Locke in Gruneberg and Wall 1984), when employees are dissatisfied with their job.

Absenteeism appears to be the first action of employee resistance although it is only a temporary solution. In an article in *Public Sector* (March 1988). Dr. Th. Katsanevas, a member of the executive office of ΠΑΣΟΚ, remarks that "public servants" absenteeism has been calculated at a percentage of 30% - 40% for various reasons." However, Achilles, a Manager, highlights the point:

"I must confess that there appear to be quite a number of unjustified absences which tends to become a permanent phenomenon. It can be attributed to political interference in the G.P.A. in that some managers, for political purposes, are very flexible in cases of absenteeism. Furthermore, absenteeism is a temporary escape from a workplace which does not meet employee needs."

Ajax, an employee in the Computing department reinforces the view that dissatisfaction leads to absenteeism.

"The conditions in my office push me away from it. Sometimes I skive off and I don't care if somebody discovers it."

I have also practiced absenteeism as a way of avoiding a workplace which made me unhappy. In some cases I used my children's pseudo-illness as a justification to take a day-off; but sometimes even a few hours away from the office was a great relief. Indeed it was this feeling

which pushed me to be involved in this project, trying for satisfaction away from a workplace which suffocated me.

Apathy is the prevailing form of resistance on a permanent basis which has been identified as a "normal" situation in the G.P.A. During their working hours employees appear to have greater concern for their private life than their public one. All the afternoon activities of employees are usually arranged during work-time through telephone calls and letters. A prevailing view is that little damage will be done by postponing pieces of work. There are hundreds of examples of this practice in public life. To this extent, it is no exaggeration to say that "working hours seem to be equal to the time of bodily pressure in the office." "Tsoukalas 1987, (However, there are no responses to highlight this fact, as employees defend their official status").

The majority of the respondents pretended that they were content with their job. Nevertheless, they would not like to talk about it in their private lives. In a sense they seemed to try to convince themselves that their work had some meaning. To acknowledge that this was not so would be too frightening because it would require fundamental changes in their lives. Hence, these workers preferred the security of familiarity and routine to the unknown alternative.

There are, however, a few employees who admitted their psychological withdrawal from their jobs and their prioritization of domestic "private life", such as Athena, a clerical public servant who has been working only for a year.

"I used to be very concerned about my job when I first came, but I'm not any more..."

Psychological withdrawal is also illuminated by I. Pega, Administrative manager in the National Printing house, in an article in *Public Sector* (July-August 1989):

"Most of the employees seek activities outside their workplace."

This statement again implies that employees psychologically withdraw from their jobs. Yet, whatever the situation for employees, they do not often resign from the G.P.A. Therefore turnover is not very high, given that the labour market in Greece is rather tight. A higher rate of turnover, however, is noticed among particularly well-qualified employees.

In an article in *Public Sector* Dr. N. Vitazakis reports that from fifty particularly well-qualified employees (Mc, PhD) in one year's time twenty two quit the public sector. Yet, Achilles, a manager, refers to a case which he know about personally, of a highly qualified public servant who "quit the G.P.A. in disappointment because he realized that nothing was going to change." Another paradox appears in the G.P.A. in the case of the managers. They themselves resist, too. They are not excluded from absenteeism. However much authority they have, they tend to practice lateness.

Managers' working hours tend to be determined at the managers' discretion, although working-time is defined by law for all employees regardless of hierarchical position. Agamemnon, an ex-top manager,

illuminates the point.

"If you are a manager, you can't say that I'm coming at 9 o'clock and I'm going in at 1 o'clock."

Agamemnon's statement reveals the prevailing managers' strategy of trying to reduce the working hours with various justifications. (Formally the working day consists of 7½ hours). For them the practice of absenteeism or lateness causes few problems once control seems to be less rigid for controllers even in bureaucracies where everybody is subject to the rules.

This also contributes to apathy-resistance leaving for tomorrow what could be done today, pretending that they have excessive responsibility and intellectual work. Many times in my public life I was told by supervisors to go back next day to discuss my work-related problems, because they were preoccupied with more serious problems. This justification, allows them to postpone the solution to another problem while giving them time to involve themselves in endless talk with peers, superiors or clients about matters barely concerning the operation of the organisation. These endless talks can be interpreted as a kind of legitimised resistance which reveals managers' unsatisfied needs for meaningful work. (Reed 1989).

Concluding, one can say that managerial control in the G.P.A. reveals some peculiarities. The majority of the responsible officials exercising control are selected on the basis of political convictions while the top-managers are clear-cut political officials. Bureaucratic control seems to take a particularly invidious form in the G.P.A., as employees

not only feel that they are controlled; they feel also that they are badly controlled. This can generate a crisis of identity and strong job dissatisfaction. Effectively, they want more, better, tighter control

As a consequence they respond with apathy, lateness, work avoidance, strategies and sometimes resignation. In these resistance strategies even managers take part. The employees need to express their resistance strongly and collectively. It is such sentiment and action which leads to the development of a trade union.

IV.4. Public servant's trade union.

The first movement for public sector trade unionism appears in the 20th century. According to Tsoukala (1986), until that time public servants seemed to be preoccupied with internal conflicts of their class while neglecting the issue of the state-employer. They appeared unable to distinguish their common interests and to resist any violation of their rights. Although the 19th century was characterized as "anomalous" for the G.P.A., public servants did not generate any particular resistance.

Even the matter of tenure which is considered as a breakthrough in public sector history was not the result of struggle but a "rule" enforced from the "top". Tsoukalas attributes this phenomenon to political, economic and social conditions under which the G.P.A. was established and which led to the creation of the view of a state bonus-giver rather than a state employer.

However, employees altered their views through the years and nowadays the public servants' trade union (ΑΔΕΔΥ) has 199,875 members which represent fifty three (53) particular occupational trade unions of the G.P.A. (K. Papaspiropoulou - Mandi 1990). Public servants membership in ΑΔΕΔΥ is 64%, given that the number of public servants (under tenure or contract) is 314,000 (K. Papaspiropoulou - Manoli 1990).

The following table, which is included in the K. Papaspiropoulou - Manoli study about the 27th congress of ΑΔΕΔΥ, shows the increase of

membership during the last decade and is based on evidence of the three last congresses of ΑΔΕΔΥ (25, 26, 27).

Congress	Occupational Trade Unions	Number of ΑΔΕΔΥ members
25 th	25	95.625
26 th	46	162.750
27 th	53	199.875

The increase of ΑΔΕΔΥ membership implies that public servants have started to become conscious about their role within society, as another class of employees and ceasing to identify so closely with the State. (Tsoukalas 1986). This point is highlighted by Laertes a trade unionist in the central committee of : ΑΔΕΔΥ

"Over the last few years, public servants gave up considering themselves as a particular class in the society. They became conscious that they belonged to a similar working class like that of factory-workers or the owners of small businesses. ΑΔΕΔΥ therefore has been involved in common demonstrations with other workers' trade-unions."

Nevertheless, public sector trade unionism maintains some peculiarities, which derive from the general legal framework within which public servants work. (Nickols and Beynon in Thompson 1983).

As an example, these public sector unions have no bargaining power, because pay and economic matters in the G.P.A. are defined by laws which concern its general operation. In this sense the role of ΑΔΕΔΥ is limited to introductory and advisory action, giving proposals for the configuration of bills concerning public sector workers' affairs. However,

the decision-making belongs to the parliament.

In order to affect the decision making AΔEΔY organises pressure actions, but that is the only power which it can exercise.

Moreover, employee participation in resistance actions is not particularly high. This is remarked on by Priamus the trade unionist who is in the central committee of AΔEΔY.

"How can we press the government when the members' participation in a strike hardly reaches 35%?"

Poor employee participation in organised actions by AΔEΔY substantially weakens AΔEΔY's power. On the other hand, the justification of this phenomenon, as employees state, is that, regardless of their participation, AΔEΔY is unable to get any results. Therefore a vicious circle of apathy and weakness emerges here. Polyxena, a clerical public servant, articulates this view which is shared by the majority of public servants:

"I don't think that AΔEΔY has reported any important achievements especially in the last few years. The reason must be sought in the political sphere.....may be there were controversies between the leadership and trade unionists with political affiliations to the party in power."

Polyxena's statement interprets, also, employee belief that AΔEΔY fails to achieve the ends it sets. Even the ends set are treated suspiciously by public servants, along with the process of achieving those ends.

Telemachus, a university qualified public servant states:

"Trade unionism has ended up as a movement for certain goals. (He implies goals instructed by the political party in power) I haven't found a unionism which doesn't serve the goals of the political parties in power."

In addition, some other employees not only share Telemachus' view but, also, do not appreciate the end set by AΔEΔY. They believe that "all" the goals AΔEΔY sets are just "one": money.

Iphigenia, a clerical public servant, articulates this point:

"AΔEΔY deals only with matters of money."

This statement supports the view that Politics highlights money as the only need of employees. Thus, not only is public opinion negative towards employee goals, but the employees themselves are disoriented. Furthermore, the statement seems to be inconsistent with employee needs, which were discussed in the previous section and which show that money, although important, is only a "second tier" target.

The public servants' trade union is also characterized by the problems generated by political interference. Political involvement was particularly strong until 1984 according to the trade unionists, Priamus and Laertes. As Priamus states:

"AΔEΔY had substantially been abolished. After a congress, which was a fiasco and, also elections which were manipulated, the majority of the leadership consisted of trade unionists who were affiliated to the political party in power."

Nevertheless, both trade unionists believe that the phenomenon belongs to the past. In conclusion, despite the dysfunctions of trade unionism in the G.P.A. it still operates as a countervailing power (Morgan 1984) which sets limits to the exercise of managerial control.

In addition, unions can create a feeling of hope in public servants that the situation in the G.P.A. will improve, while they, also, feel less

vulnerable to managerial dictates. (G. Peter 1978).

The recent increase in the membership tends to support those arguments. Furthermore, the goals ΑΔΕΔΥ set in the last congress, such as implementation of meritocratic criteria for employees' recruitment and promotion (K. Papaspiropoulou - Manoli 1990) prove that ΑΔΕΔΥ intends not only to operate as a countervailing power but seeks to be a generative, productive source of power within the workplace in order to generate important social changes.

IV.5. Conclusion

This chapter has explored the various theories of organisation which introduce control as the main function of management or as the management itself. According to labour process theories, managerial control was generated to facilitate the capitalists' interests. However, the form of control which seems to serve this aim, while creating less resistance is bureaucratic control. It operates in an insidious way, through impersonal rules and orders, giving employees the feeling of not being controlled, thereby minimizing their resistance.

Bureaucratic control appears to be the most suitable form of control in large organisations and public bureaucracies. However, in the G.P.A. it is Politics which shapes the nature of control and resistance. Political involvement impinges on the implementation of bureaucratic control and leads it to malfunction while generating employee resistance. Resistance is expressed through apathy, disenchantment, absenteeism, psychological withdrawal and a degree of turnover. Control is also tightly related to employee identity crises in the G.P.A., while preventing them from practising changes.

Collective and active employee resistance is manifested through public sector trade unions. Unionism in the G.P.A. operates in an advisory capacity to the government as far as public servants' affairs are concerned but also reacts strongly (strikes, stoppages of work) to protect employee rights to achieve certain goals. Having explored "*rouspheti*"

in the context of selection process (chapter 3) and managerial control and labour resistance, chapter 4, the final empirical chapter, will now consider workplace culture in the G.P.A.

Chapter V : Workplace culture

V.1. Introduction

This chapter seeks to complete the question under consideration, that Politics has a decisive influence in bureaucracy, by analyzing elements which form the organizational structure of the G.P.A.

As has already been discussed, managerial control contributes to the formation of a certain organisational culture, which, in the case of the G.P.A. is a culture of apathy and resistance. However, there are additional factors such as societal traits and practices which greatly contribute to the configuration of the organisational culture. therefore both the formation of cliques within the workplace and the generation of relationships based on Political convictions will be highlighted as having a decisive role in the operation of the G.P.A.

V.2. Culture of the G.P.A.

2.a. Brief Review of Organisational Culture

Before we examine the organisational culture of the G.P.A. it is necessary to refer briefly to the concept of culture as it has been viewed by organisational theorists and sociologists.

The concept of culture is "one of the two or three most complicated words in the English language" states William (1976, cited in Clegg and Redding 1990, p.31]). Culture is a complicated term not only in the English language, I would argue, but also in every other language as it is connected with a great deal of social, political and educational phenomena. Different social sciences operate with different definitions and meanings of culture. For the process of this study culture will be considered in relation to organisation.

Weber views culture as a value-concept (Clegg and Dunkerley 1980). As he states "Empirical reality becomes "culture" to us because and in so far as we relate it to value ideas. It includes those segments and only those segments of reality which have become significant to us because of the value relevance". (p. 38).

Mats Alvesson (1987), in his study of "*Organisational culture and ideology*" presents five definitions given by some theorists who treat the organisation as their key point of reference.

For Louis "culture... refers to a shared system of values, norms and

symbols. The term culture conveys an entire image, an integrated set of dimensions/characteristics, and the whole beyond the part. Bate (in Alvesson, 1978) considers culture as "the ideas, meanings and values people hold in common and to which they subscribe collectively" while for Pettigrew (in Alvesson 1987) "culture is the system of ... publicly and accepted contemplated meanings operating for a given group at a given time". (p. 5).

Trice and Beyer (in Alvesson 1987) put emphasis on the components of culture which are:

1. "its substance or the network of meanings contained in its ideologies, norms and values; 2. its forms, or the practices whereby these meanings are expressed affirmed and communicated to members". Finally Morgan (1984) introduces culture as "shared meanings, shared understandings and shared sense making... In talking about culture we are talking about a process of reality construction that allows people to see and understand particular events, actions, objects, utterances, or situations in distinctive ways". (p. 128). Edgar Schein (1985), also defines culture as "the basic assumptions and beliefs shared by members of the organisation that operate unconsciously and what define in a basic taken for granted fashion an organisation's view of itself and its environment". (p. 7).

For Morgan (1986) culture illuminates in particular the human side of organisation. Observation of day-to-day functioning of the organisational groups (s) to which one belongs, as if one was an outsider,

shows the culture or the subculture of the area.

As one becomes aware of the ways that individuals interact, the language they use, the images and themes of their discussion and their daily ritualism one discovers and defines the culture of those specific areas (Morgan 1986). Culture develops gradually and it is the result of the groups experience. It is a kind of necessity for groups to adopt a common language among themselves (F. Hefforn 1989); a way of setting boundaries and selecting members; setting norms for handling interpersonal relationships; criteria for rewarding or punishing their members. Therefore, cultures have taboos and forbidden or enforced forms of behaviour - i.e. they are characterized by informal rules.

As one tries to find explanations for the aspects of the organisational culture, one is usually led to the history of the workplace or the society in which the organisation develops. (Morgan 1986). History has stressed many variations in national characteristics and views of the meaning of life along with differences in national philosophies and patterns of organisation and administration. Dyson (1989) argues that "countries have evolved their own distinctive industrial cultures which reflect traditions of public authority but are also moulded by the historical conditions of industrialization. Such industrial cultures are expressed in attitudes and behaviour but are also embodied in institutions and form a mediating factor in the policy process". (in Clegg and Redding, p. 131)]. In his view, applied to East Asia, for instance, "the success of organisation in Japan, Korea, Tawian,

Hong Kong, and Singapore was due in large part to certain key traits shared by the majority of organisation members which were attributable to an upbringing in the Confucian tradition". (H. Kahn [1979], cited in Clegg and Redding [1990. p. 38]. Some commentators, such as Morgan, have noted how what may be conceived as macro-cultural phenomena, can have important organizational consequences. Japanese workers, he notes differ from British. While the former appear dedicated to the system, even if she/he finds many aspects of the system distasteful, the latter often defines him/herself as in opposition to a system which they perceive to have exploited their ancestors and them as well.

In France, as Crozier outlines, bureaucratic organisations have their peculiarities attributable to the French social culture. Likewise, Greek organisations appear differentiated from those of other European countries, because of their cultural characteristics. (Tsoukalas 1986, Mouzelis 1978, Athanasopoulos 1983). Thus, as Morgan has proposed "the point is that culture whether Japanese, Arab, British, Canadian, Chinese, French or American, shapes the character of the organisation". (Morgan 1986, p. 117).

According to M. Alvesson, (1987) values, ideologies and cultural competencies which appear in organisational life are primarily rooted in the social culture. He also believes that general ideologies of ethics of work are of decisive importance for people's motives and aspirations, along with the differences between the sexes and among the various minority groups.

Alvesson's view is supported by F. Heffron (1989) who argues that Americans in their homes, in their schools, by their peers and by the mass media have been exposed to and pressurized to accept the dominant values of American society. Many of these values reflect and reinforce those found within the organisation. Likewise, in trying to find the features and elements in the culture that influence behaviour in the G.P.A. one will go to social culture to seek for an explanation.

2.b. Factors influencing the G.P.A.

The conventional upbringing of children in Greece is based on allegiance to "the State", "the religion" and "the family". These three values constitute the foundations of Greek society, as history emphasizes.

As a matter of fact, Greeks seem to neglect the notion of the state in their everyday life and yet they appear to be extremely nationalistic when the state is threatened (Vacalopoulos, 1983). As some writers remark, Greeks confront their State in an inimical or suspicious way (G. Langrod, 1964, Woodhouse, 1990). "The state is the hereditary enemy, identified with anonymous bureaucracy", remarks Woodhouse (1990) in his article about the *Greek psyche*, while G. Langrod (1964) in a study about the G.P.A. states: "... Greek nation has an implicit idea about the state... the Turkish occupation has left traces of suspicion towards any kind of authority".

Furthermore the role of Politics throughout the years allows a

great number of interpretations about the aims of the state and the role of politicians. "The function of a Member of Parliament is to defend his constituent's personal interests, to secure jobs for them and to exercise influence. National policy-making is well down the list of his priorities", reveals Woodhouse (1990) again, explaining this way, why Greeks are suspicious towards their state.

The role of Politics seems to reinforce Greek's inherent individualism (Vacalopoulos 1983). The president of Greece K. Karamanlis, according to Woodhouse (1990), who has written a biography of Karamanlis, pointed out that Greeks are individualists "whose loyalties in normal times are strong only in proportion to their narrowness: to their families, their relations, their neighbours, their province, but rarely (except in times of war or national crisis) to the state". (Woodhouse, 1990. p. 6). This individualism leads Greeks to use every means in order to achieve their personal goals (Vacalopoulos 1983). Therefore, cliques in the workplace many times appear to be used in order to facilitate individual interests. Furthermore, political patronage and clientelism also serve individuality when material inducements are provided in a micro-level which entails benefits to families or to individuals. "This device turns into an explicit exchange of benefits for votes". (Etzioni-Halevy 1979, p.10).

However, Greeks, also, have the tendency to involve themselves in Political affairs and debates. It is the philosophy of Aristotle which enhances this tendency: "„, the citizens must contribute to the common

interest..." (Politics). This strong politicization of Greeks has been commented on very often, as characteristic of the Greek nation. Winston Churchill points out in his memoirs: "The Greeks rival the Jews in being the most political-minded race in the world". (W. Churchill, "the second world war", vol. 5, p. 413). The tendency to politicization in correlation to the tendency to individualism contributes greatly to the configuration of the peculiar organisational culture, where Politics underlie the aspects of organisational life. Thus, it is not surprising that the primary concern of personnel in Greek organisations when a newly-appointed employee appears is his/her political identity. From experience I know and comments from research respondents confirm that nobody wonders about the qualification or the personality of the "new person". The basic question is always: "What is the political party he/she supports?" The future social and organisational life of the "new person" is absolutely dependent on the reply to this question. Friendships, participation in cliques, isolation or not, everything is determined by the answer to this critical question. This phenomenon will be considered further in the next section.

The family, is a critical value for Greek society. As has been mentioned above, the Greeks consider the family to be a basic concern. Indeed, patronage and political clientelism rely on the allegiance of Greeks to their family. Also, the conventional image of the working woman and the prevailing idea that woman's natural position is in the house, is tightly connected with the value of the family in Greek society.

However, religion, which constitutes the third basic element of Greek culture, seems also to contribute to the status of the working woman and so affect the configuration of the organisational culture.

Religion helps to design the ideal type of "citizen" and "employee". Religion is in addition, tightly linked with nationalism. Indeed, the Greek Orthodox Church played a crucial part in maintaining the Greek language and their historical continuity during 400 years of Turkish occupation. Therefore, the notion of a "good Christian" seems to be interrelated to the notion of "good citizen". (Tsoukalas, 1986).

I could argue that a part of the common passivity of employees in the workplace should be attributed to the influence of religion. A central principle of religious philosophy is self-sacrifice: i.e. people must "grin and bear it" regardless of the situation they are in. Accordingly, employees are not encouraged to think about resistance. Employee passivity merely reproduces these same conditions which generate workers' dissatisfaction. However, religion can also be considered from a positive perspective, as it leads employees to consider their job in a meaningful way as contributing to society. Religion therefore, is clearly related to identity.

As I argued earlier religion also seems to underlie the status of the sexes in Greek society as a whole and in specific organisations in particular. Despite the principle that all people are equal, women seem to be burdened with many more obligations toward's society than men. Women must be humble and patient mothers, wives, sisters, whose end

is a perpetual offering to those surrounding them. The stereotyped roles also seem expected within the workplace, (Morgan 1986). Therefore it is not surprising for example that women are the most likely people to prepare the coffee for their male superiors and their male peers, (*Public Sector*, July-August, 1989).


It is also the religious influence which constitutes the perception women who go to work in trousers as less respectable. (It is forbidden, by religion, for women to wear trousers, as they are men's clothes). A few years ago (in the late seventies) the superior of the service where I work refused to allow us to go to work in trousers. Even nowadays, the appearance of a public servant in trousers is not commented on positively.

However, employees in the G.P.A. do not seem to put any emphasis on the influence of religion on the reproduction of their organisational culture. Perhaps is the tacit and implicit nature of religion so that it is barely noticed yet all pervasive. Thus, the interviewees whom I contacted during the development of this project, did not make a clear-cut reference to religion as a factor which affects the workplace. Even the status of the working-woman in the G.P.A. and matters of gender were referred to as clearly social issues unconnected with religion.

What appeared to be the main, if not the only, factor which contributes to the construction and maintenance of organisational culture in the G.P.A. was its strong Politicization, through the formation of

cliques and informal alliances. This factor will now be discussed further alongside other elements which appear to determine the culture of the G.P.A. In particular, I will focus on the interpersonal relationships of employees in the G.P.A. According to Crozier (1964) these social relations of production are potential factors which help to reveal the culture.

An examination of these relations in the G.P.A. reveals that in addition to the influence of Greek culture upon the workplace, with its shared values and assumptions, there are also countervailing fragmentary pressures. Cliques and informal alliances reflect a heterogeneity in the culture of the G.P.A. which stands in contradictory tension to the broader social culture of shared Greek values. The heterogeneity seems to be the consequence of the link of the G.P.A. with Politics. It is, furthermore, reinforced by "the regulations of personnel management which is concerned with powers, obligations and spheres of competencies while neglecting such matters as job content or the adequacy of available skills".(Ferrareci in Clegg, Dow and Bareham 1983, p. 147). One could represent this relation as follows:



V. 3. Interpersonal and intergroup relationships

This section focuses on the interpersonal and intergroup relationships of employees within their workplace. It does so in order to reveal the cultural traits of the G.P.A. and to examine whether these are affected by the social culture and how they are related to the bureaucratic process in the G.P.A.

"The common interest gathers people together as long as each one lives happily within it". (Aristotles 'Politics' p. 159). However it is not only for this reason that people gather together. For Vacalopoulos (1987) it is individual interest which drives people to form cliques and groups and join political parties while the common interest is ignored.

Both writers refer to Greek culture and society and deal with the formation of cliques within this context. It is Vacalopoulos (1983) who reveals another reason for the formation of groups or cliques. This reason consists in the employees' need for identity through cliques. Of course, it is not original to Greeks to seek for identity within groups, that seems to be a common feature of many cultures. However, what is significant for Greeks is that the cliques and the groups through which they identify themselves are primarily based on the communality of Political convictions. Therefore, the majority, if not all, of the cliques and informal groups which are formed in the G.P.A. are based on the sharing of common Political views.

We have already discussed in the second chapter the historical

elements which explain this tight link with Politics. The same historical factors (Political clientelism, patronage) influence the formation of cliques. Furthermore, Greeks' tendency to form cliques in the G.P.A. is reinforced by the bureaucratic structure. As Dalton (1959) advocates the division of labour also encourages employees to form cliques. In the case of the G.P.A., because of the bureaucratic structure on the one hand and the strong party-politicization on the other hand, employees often feel isolated from the decision-making centres. In this sense they try to affect decision-making within the organisation through their groups, which cut across different categories and hierarchical levels and which exercise pressure on the formal organisation.

The Greek phenomenon of cliques in the G.P.A. runs counter to Crozier's findings concerning French organisational culture. According to his research in French public organisations there are no clans, no cliques of any sort and none of them was even known to cut across different categories. As he argues this is a consequence of bureaucracy and of the formal groups to which individuals belong. Individuals are entrenched in their status drawing upon their formal positions as a means of personal protection. Therefore informal groups seem to be useless in the French case. Furthermore, as Crozier remarks, possible separate informal activities are likely to threaten the cohesion of the formal groups, while cliques that cut across categories are regarded as objectionable, in particular as they foster favouritism.

There is a distinct contrast between the views of Crozier and

Dalton with regard to the formation of cliques. Whereas for Dalton the division of labour, and to this extent, bureaucracy, encourages the formation of cliques, for Crozier bureaucracy discourages such informal grouping. The G.P.A. case seem to confirm Doulton's view because employees from cliques either to affect decision-making which formally would be impossible, or to protect themselves.

In contrast to Crozier's findings, the formal groups in the G.P.A. operate only temporarily and for such a period as it is necessary for specific interests to be protected or certain aims to be achieved. The formal groups do not provide a particular protection to their members. Furthermore they keep their members in a very loose way which allow them to join various groups within or outside the organisation. Therefore it seems to be natural for the same employee to join different groups or cliques. However, this "belongingness" to the different cliques at the same time, might generate a great deal of contradictory obligations to the employees. Therefore sometimes the interest of a clique contrasts with the interest of a certain formal category of employee. Then the employees who joins both groups find themselves in a very difficult situation, especially when they know that the power of the clique over the formal organisation is particularly strong.

Personally, I faced this problem when the clique I supposedly belonged to, wanted the members of my formal class (administrative class) to provide a certain service. In order to achieve that the clique tried to influence the formal leadership. The members of the formal class

resisted by refusing to do what they were asked because they believed that it was not their responsibility to provide this service. Thus I found myself in a very difficult situation as by supporting my formal class-group, I faced the disapproval of the clique.

Informal groups within the G.P.A. keep their members together regardless of their hierarchical level and the official post they hold. They operate in the shadow of the formal organisation and their existence often remains unknown. Although the majority of employees in the G.P.A. join such cliques, they often avoid publicizing their participation in them. Employees on the other hand who are not in the cliques are aware of their existence while others consider participation in these cliques to be inevitable. These points are illustrated by the following statements of some employees:

"There are informal groups based on different political ideas. There are cliques either open or closed to new members which form a climate of acceptance or non-acceptance for employees. You are never sure about what is happening behind your back" says Athena, a newly appointed public servant. "I don't know for sure if there are some informal groups, but I can sense them... I can smell in the air that there are some unidentified forces which affect several situations". confesses Adromache, who belongs to the educational staff of the Ministry but holds an administrative post.

However, Nestor, from the educational staff of TEI believes that

you must belong to those informal cliques if you want to be protected from the actions of oppositions. Otherwise if you try to be independent, you will have all cliques against you".

All these statements reveal that cliques dominate the G.P.A.. The last

statement additionally reinforces the view we hold that employees in the G.P.A. present a high degree of defensiveness.

However, one can define cliques, one can be completely aware of their power over the formal organisation unless one is an active member of these cliques. From personal experience I know that members of such cliques become extremely powerful and play a critical role in the operation of the formal organisation. Some cliques are highly developed to the point where they specifically shape the way that organisation is managed. Indeed, leaders of cliques regardless of their hierarchical rank are very often approached by the formal leadership of the organisation in order to contribute to the solution of certain problems or to influence the selection of candidates for certain positions, or support certain policies within the organisation.

Informal leaders of cliques very seldom seek to take a formal leading post or a formal powerful position. They seem to prefer acting behind-the-scenes. Thus, when on one occasion I asked such a person why he does not take a managerial position within the organisation, as it would be easy for him to achieve that, he replied that the power is in governing and controlling behind-the-scenes. This suggests that the power in the "informal organisation" must be greater compared with the one of formal organisation. Also, informal leaders seem to have less responsibilities and are able to avoid the frictions that formal relationships cause and employee's resistance that control causes, as we showed in the previous chapter.

Although nobody can be completely aware of what is going on with these informal groups, it is clear that these groups not only develop solidarity among their members, but also show it to outsiders who reveal their Political convictions to the public servants with whom they deal. Thus outsiders, in order to have better and quicker service, try to approach public servants, who have similar Political convictions with them, after they have discovered who shares which political ideas.

Artemis, a clerical public servant highlights the above point:

"If somebody belongs to our clique or supports the same political party as we do, we treat him/her in a particular way."

What Artemis implies, is that the transactions in the G.P.A. either among employees or between employees and clients seem to be subject to interpersonal relationships. Her statement also stresses once again the lack of impersonality in the bureaucratic procedures in the G.P.A. as well as the role of Politics in the configuration of the policy of the organisation. (p. α P).

The power of the clique relies on the exchange of formal and informal information. As employees of every hierarchical level and every category of the organisation are involved, information for every category of the organisation is available to the members of the informal groups.

Also, within informal groups, decisions are taken about problems to be solved or situations to be affected in the formal organisation. These decisions seem to be proposed from the members of the informal groups, through their formal status. Therefore, in this way employees satisfy

their need to participate in decision-making, something they could not achieve through formal procedures.

The intensive tendency of the employees to form groups or cliques might derive amongst the other reasons we have already identified, from employees' fear of being isolated within the organisation. There are cases when employees do not want to be involved in any kind of informal business but they are afraid of being isolated. This is illustrated by Athena a clerical public servant :

"I prefer to be with those (groups, colleagues) with any consequence rather than to stick to my independence and become isolated."

What she highlights is on the one hand the necessity of joining a group of colleagues, a clique, and on the other hand the need for social life in the workplace. This group membership/conformity is fuelled by the fear of isolation and its accompanying sense of insecurity. The need for social contact can be exploited by the various political parties. Through their "active supporters" political parties try to pass their message and shape the conditions in the workplace according to their will. All the employees answering to my question "what affects them mostly in their workplace" remarked that the human environment, collaboration with peers and superiors are the most important factors.

Athena and Alcestis, the clerical public servants, highlighted this point:

"The room I work in doesn't affect me as much as the people I work with." points out Athena, while

Alcestis states:

"It happens for a whole week that you are unable to perform and make a lot of mistakes because of several problems caused by human relations."

Both statements reveal the importance of the interpersonal relationships, and point out, especially the second, that the formality of bureaucracy is not enough to facilitate efficiency. The informal background is more important and seems to transform the formal bureaucratic structure.

Yet the conflict in the organisation is highly detrimental for the employees' interpersonal relationships, because of the existence of these different cliques. Conflict seems rather natural as the different cliques defend different interests, aim to achieve different goals and try to serve as best they can the political party they support. However, although these conflicts take place behind-the-scenes, they reinforce the already established climate of apathy in the G.P.A. According to Crozier (1964) apathy is a rational response when employees want to evade conflicts and to escape dependent relationships. Thus, besides the managerial control which leads the Greek public servants to apathy and to psychological withdrawal from their job, it is also, the tiredness from the every day struggle against visible and invisible Political forces which leads to the same result.

From the foregoing analysis it is apparent that employees in the G.P.A. are overwhelmed by a feeling of insecurity which leads them to develop a kind of defensiveness. The formation and activity of cliques reinforces this feeling for employees. The fact that tenure is established does not seem to affect particularly the employees interpersonal

relationships. They take tenure for granted and they develop their insecurity even within it. This insecurity has nothing to do with their fear of dismissal but has a lot to do with employees identity within the workplace. As has been revealed from the previous chapter employees need seem to be more abstract nowadays. Therefore the insecurity which is a consequence of employees relationships is rather a psychological matter, whose roots must be sought in the role of Politics as they have emerged from history and social culture.

Interpersonal and intergroup relationships also reveal that bureaucracy does not appear to be accommodated in the G.P.A. culture. As G. Peter (1978) remarks, for a culture to accept bureaucracy means that it accepts the impersonality and universality of the rules. Moreover, Greek culture, as has been indicated so far, does not appear to have any tendency to comply with these bureaucratic principles. It rather seems to use these principles in theory to cover the fact that the every day practice is the opposite. To this extent, cliques could be also considered as a form of employees' resistance against manipulation by the bureaucratic organisational structure of the G.P.A.

Summarizing, the interpersonal and intergroup relationships in the G.P.A. reflect the social culture of Greece. Political convictions characterize the relationships and become the basis for the formation of cliques in the workplace. Analysis of cliques and employees' interpersonal relationships reveal employees' insecurity and intensive defensiveness on the one hand and rejection of the bureaucratic

principles from the operation of the G.P.A. on the other hand. Therefore, by examining the "determinants" of the organisational culture, which according to Crozier are the intergroup and interpersonal relationships, our view that Politics play a detrimental role in the operation of the G.P.A. is reinforced.

V.4. Conclusion

One of the key findings of this research is that the culture of the society significantly affects the culture of the organisation. But in addition the findings in the chapter show that localized workplace cultures may be highly fragmentary and heterogeneous despite the unifying elements of the wider social culture. Indeed these countervailing tendencies may simultaneously characterize the organisational culture of the G.P.A.

The workplace in the G.P.A. is dominated by the cliques and informal groups which are formed on the basis of the communality of employees' political convictions. Although the values of the Greek society, that is to say loyalty to the state, to the religion and to the family, underlie the employees' behaviour and contribute to the configuration of the organisational culture, it is the strong feeling of politicization which mainly influences the relationships.

Cliques, therefore, because of their fragmentary nature, enforce their own culture in the G.P.A. The activity of these cliques seems to be critical for the operation of the formal organisation. Their role is not limited to the protection of the interests of their members but it extends further other aspects of organisational culture. Therefore, cliques contribute to the decision-making in the organisation, either by exercising pressure on the responsible officials or by using the formal status of their members to implement decisions taken within the cliques.

Thus, within the G.P.A. the influence of informal groups is stronger than that of formal rules and relationships. This organisational culture appears not to accommodate the ideal burreaucratic principles. In addition, the G.P.A. culture reveals that strong politicization is a potential factor which distorts the ideal bureaucracy by attacking it on those points (impersonality and universality of rules) on which bureaucracy bases its superiority as an organisational and controlling system

Furthermore this chapter also reveals a tension between the harmonizing aspects of culture at the societal level and the fragmentary nature of cliques and alliances in the more localized culturre of the G.P.A.

CONCLUSION

The aim of this work was to examine the contemporary operation of the G.P.A., drawing on sociological theories of bureaucracy and empirical research in the services of the G.P.A. The study also addressed the widely reported inefficiency of the G.P.A. The research led to the following key findings:

1. Dysfunctions of bureaucracy are reinforced by "*rouspheti*" and Political interference in every aspect of practice in the G.P.A.
2. Managerial control is tightly related to the employees' identity with the G.P.A.
3. Managerial control leads to inefficiency.
4. Employees resist managerial control through indifference.
5. Employees in the G.P.A. showed a high degree of defensiveness, seeking for security, and a fear of change.
6. There are two sorts of Politics: Politics with a capital "P" (the policy, politics of government or political parties) and politics - policy with a small "p" (the policy of organisation). Big "P" often shapes small "p".
7. Cliques shape a fragmentary culture in the G.P.A. while revealing the powerful role of the informal procedures in the formal operation of the G.P.A.
8. Bureaucracy is negative as far as its suffix "cracy" is concerned. This suffix gives to bureaucracy the power to be imposed on employees and to control them.

According to Weberian theory, bureaucracy is introduced as the

organisational-control form which in particular, provides efficiency. Bureaucracy has been seen as an instrument or tool of unrivalled technical superiority. However, it has been revealed through the criticism of bureaucracy that it is ambivalent that bureaucracy guarantees efficiency. Furthermore a great emphasis has been put by various theorists on the dysfunction of bureaucracy, such as dehumanization. Even Weber's latest work showed an intensive scepticism as to whether bureaucracy dehumanizes organisations and turns employees into little "cogs" in the machine, whose only concern is to become bigger cogs. The mechanistic way of functioning implies that bureaucracy deprives employees' creativity and desire of taking initiatives. It also isolates the majority of employees from decision-making and therefore, employees' conscious compliance is not achieved.

However, bureaucracy as a control system enforces compliance through mechanisms such as punishment and achieves the execution of the "order" through power delegated on several hierarchical levels. But as the labour process theorists remark the result of control is resistance which is expressed in various ways ranking from work stoppage and strike to psychological withdrawal from job and resignation.

The analysis of the findings, which were mentioned above, revealed that in the G.P.A. the bureaucratic dysfunctions appeared to be enhanced because of the existence of strong Political involvement. Politics very

often shape the policy of the G.P.A. The workplace is characterized by employees' tendency to identify themselves through their Political allegiance to the various political parties. The roots of this tendency were found in Greek history and the social culture which affected significantly the development of the G.P.A. As has been analysed in the second chapter, after Greece's liberation from the Turkish occupation the lack of economic resources in the private sector led the citizens to seek work in the G.P.A. This strong demand for work in the G.P.A. became the reason for the development of the political clientelism, patronage and "*rouspheti*".

Powerful landowners and politicians offered work in the G.P.A. while taking in exchange the votes and the support of the citizens. Citizens, on the other hand, through this relationship of exchange considered themselves linked with the state authority. Therefore "*rouspheti*" was established as the main, if not the only, means of any kind of transaction with the state, while Political interference in the bureaucratic procedures came to be considered a natural and interwoven action in the operation of the G.P.A.

Bureaucratic procedures such as selection, employees' allocation, promotion are the first places where the Political interference appears and establishes the employees' dependence on Politics. Most of the selection systems applied in the G.P.A., so far were underlined by the idea "to the

winners the booty." Selection systems based on merit or, at least, on fairness did not last long in the G.P.A., as they go against the political dependence of the employees. Thus, for example, the last enacted law (1735/1987) concerning employees' selection in the G.P.A. was never applied, although recruitment has taken place at an extremely frequent pace in the last year. This recruitment was based on clear-cut party-political criteria, on "*rouspheti*" in other words, and aimed to influence the electorate in favour of the party in power. Now the new government is intended to change this system.

The recruitment based on "*rouspheti*" - i.e. it is both unfair and inefficient - undermines the bureaucratic principle of impersonality; it, also, supplies the G.P.A. with inadequate personnel. In this way the ground for inefficiency is laid. The personnel, however, is not only inadequate but is also overnumerous and unequally allocated to the various services in the G.P.A. This is also a consequence of the Political interference in the bureaucratic process.

The fact that tenure has been established for public servants since 1911 does not allow the political mastery to replace the personnel loyal to the previous government with a new one loyal to the government of the day. However, it is easy for the political party in power to add its "friends" to the working force of the G.P.A. As a result the G.P.A. appears particularly overcrowded.

The excess personnel, however, is not allocated according to the needs of the services. Yet, the golden rule which requires the suitable person for the right position in order for efficiency to be achieved, is not taken into account in the G.P.A. In this sense, political interference does not attack only impersonality but runs, also, counter to the career development, given that career development depends on the position the employee holds.

Promotion and appraisal systems are the other bureaucratic functions which have been manipulated by Politics. Many research respondents complained that regardless of whether they are managers or clerical public servants, the appraisal system is either non-existent or is limited to a formal worthless procedure. The official records are either neglected altogether or given the same high appraisal for all employees, with the exclusion of extremely distinctive cases. Identical official reports are unfair to employees but free Political mastery and managers to promote the preferred persons, as there is no need to justify choosing one among equals!

Promotion to the most senior hierarchical positions is particularly vulnerable to political interference. The Political convictions of the candidates for these positions play a critical role. However, it is not only that promotion to these positions is a politically sensitive procedure, but, also, the preservation of these positions is a matter dependent on the

"Politics". Thus, every governmental change usually entails a kind of rearrangement in the various managerial positions. Because of that managers especially, but supervisors as well, live in a climate of uncertainty. This greatly affects their work performance while it contrasts with the bureaucratic idea about "career" in the organisation. Furthermore, managers and supervisors who operate under this climate of uncertainty, appear to be extremely sensitive to the Political pressures, a fact which predefines the way that they deal with the function of bureaucratic control.

Its insidious nature makes bureaucratic control particularly attractive to Politics. By using bureaucracy the Political mastery controls the G.P.A. and through that society. However, what is neglected by Politics is the fact that control will often generate resistance regardless of how insidious the former happens to be. This resistance is reinforced by the fact that the employees' needs are not satisfied, as bureaucratic control enforces employees' compliance and does not achieve that by consensus. That generates employees' identity crisis. However, employees' do not always practice resistance strategies effectively. In many ways they seem to be counter-productive because they reproduce the very same conditions of bureaucracy and political manipulation which they oppose. They also fail to generate the collective opposition on which strong resistance could be built.

The organisational culture of the G.P.A. is, therefore, affected by the exercise of bureaucratic control. The social culture, in addition, contributes to the configuration of the culture of the G.P.A., a central element of which is the widespread preference for informality over formality. The formation of cliques and the development of informal activities are based on employees' strong feeling for Politicization. This strong tendency towards Politicization constitutes a relatively unique trait of Greek society and inevitable underlies relationships in the workplace. This is especially the case in the G.P.A. as the foregoing chapters illustrate.

Equally, cliques and informal groups provide alternative means for establishing identity in conditions where the dignity and significance of many employees is constantly being eroded. Yet, the informal activities which are developed within the G.P.A. display the unsatisfied needs of the employees for participation in decision-making. It, also, shows the tendency of employees to undertake functions from which they are deprived by the bureaucratic formality. Furthermore, employees try to regain in this way their subjective value as human beings which had been minimized by the bureaucratic structure.

So on the basis of the research, what could be done to improve efficiency and fairness in the G.P.A.? The findings of this research confirm the ambiguity in the value of bureaucracy as a structure -

control organisational system which provides efficiency. The existence of a potential factor such as Politics in the context of Greek culture was sufficient to lead to inefficiency, by reinforcing the bureaucratic dysfunctions. There is a complex relationship between formal bureaucratic ideal and informal "*rouspheti*" practices in the G.P.A. This is a relationship in which "*rouspheti*" and bureaucracy reinforce each other.

To this extent the G.P.A. must be transformed. The basis of this transformation must be the elimination of "*rouspheti*" and the humanization of bureaucracy. The elimination of "*rouspheti*" requires the depoliticization of the G.P.A., a fact which additionally corresponds with employees' desires for meritocracy. Although it has been argued that neutrality of administration encloses the danger of the development of an autonomous dominating class within society, the democratic parliamentary structure of the state seems to safeguard it from this possible development. The fact that in the top of the administrative hierarchy there is a member of parliament (minister) minimizes the danger of bureaucracy being an uncontrolled autonomous class. However, participation of societal forces in the decision-making of the administrative policies would contribute to a further reduction of the threat of "bureaucratic domination."

In this sense the G.P.A. must be transformed on a basis of a

party-political consensus. The political parties must prevent interventions of any kind in the administrative process and therefore to contribute to a possible degree of neutrality of the G.P.A. That must be the first and critical step for the transformation of the G.P.A.

Then, the concern should be shifted to the administrative structures. Humanization of bureaucracy draws on a great number of issues. All the bureaucratic principles must be reformed under the light of the recognition of the invaluable potentiality of the human being. Thus, the G.P.A. must be directed towards freeing and activating the human resources within it. Employees must be allowed to "mature" by substantial participation in the administrative process and undertaking of responsibilities.

Employees' participation in the decision-making should be critical issue in the reorganisation of the G.P.A. Employees' participation would lead to the elimination of resistance and of resentment of employees while it would help a climate of cooperation and collaboration to be established. It, also, would leave space for the creativity and imagination of employees to be developed and would make them willing to undertake responsibilities.

The holding of knowledge would be basic element in the substantial participation of employees in the administrative process. Knowledge and skills necessary to complete the job, are preconditions for

an effective workplace. This must be matter of concern in the G.P.A. Training courses must be organised not only at the beginning of public servants' careers but also throughout the employees' working life. Employees must be encouraged to adjust their knowledge and skills to the new technology and new methods of work. In this manner, they would feel confident in the performance of their work.

The distribution of work which leads to specialization should be organised on another basis. All the members of the office must deal periodically with all subject of the work. Thus, although for a certain time they deal with a certain job, they know how to get on with the job of their colleagues. In this way, when everybody in an office knows how to deal with all jobs no one obtains any specific power because of specialization of expertise.

The hierarchy, on the other hand, which exists only in order to preserve authority, to transmit commands and to be used by "Politics", should rather be abolished or, at least, find a meaningful reason for being sustained. However, it should definitely not exist to reinforce Political control over employees in the G.P.A. and through them over society. If there is a point which must be examined deeply that is the reform of hierarchical structures of the G.P.A.. However there hierarchical structures constitute the sources which maintain the system of control and therefore they never appear as a matter in the political parties'

agenda. Political manipulation relies on them.

To this extent it is ambivalent if the Political forces will contribute to a radical debureaucratization while maintaining the sources which reproduce the system of control. Therefore, the question will be always there: Is there any possibility for Political forces to give up interfering in the G.P.A. when the G.P.A. reinforces their power in controlling the society?

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